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This Note proposes a novel solution to standing problems faced by
environmental plaintifs seeking to enforce, or to compel agencies to enforce,
environmental regulation. It argues that environmental plaintifs should be able
to obtain standing to bring an Administrative Procedure Act (APA) review
action or a citizen suit based on ownership of private tradable environmental
resource rights, created by increasingly popular environmental privatization
programs. These rights should operate as a basis for standing even for
plaintifs who would otherwise be unable to meet standing requirements of
individual injury, causation, and redressability. Relying on tradable rights to
environmental resources as a basis for standing in APA review actions or
citizen suits would maximize the benefits of citizen participation while averting
the concerns associated with broad grants ofstanding.
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Introduction
During the latter part of the twentieth century, the political and judicial
branches have grappled with agency failure to implement regulatory legislation,
especially environmental protection measures.' To enhance enforcement of
regulatory legislation, Congress provided for citizen enforcement suits and
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) review actions. These measures were
designed to take advantage of public citizens' diverse knowledge and
motivation by enabling citizens to participate, through courts, in policing and
supplementing agency enforcement and implementation of public interest
regulations.2 Incidents like the recent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico illustrate
that citizens are often in a unique position to recognize, in advance, failures to
comply with regulatory obligations that create grave environmental hazards.
Thus, citizen participation stands to prevent hazardous regulatory failures,
guarding the public value and safety. However, these means of citizen
participation-both citizen enforcement actions and APA review actions-have
been severely curtailed by standing requirements imposed by courts. In
particular, courts hold that these plaintiffs, regardless of the validity of their
underlying claims, are unable to bring suit because they cannot sufficiently
demonstrate concrete and particularized injury that is unique to them.3
1. For examples of this literature, see JAMES 0. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1978); PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY
INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES (1981); KAYE LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T.
TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1986); THE POLITICS OF REGULATION
(James Q. Wilson ed., 1980); Arthur S. Miller, The President and Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40.
VAND. L. REV. 389 (1987); and Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
2. 1 propose that tradable rights may serve as a basis for standing in two different types of
actions that I refer to generally as "citizen participation": (a) citizen enforcement actions, or citizen suits,
where a statute grants members of the public the right to prosecute private entities or state and local
actors that are violating environmental protection laws; and (b) APA review actions in which members
of the public sue an agency itself for failing to implement or comply with its own enabling legislation.
See Eileen Gauna, Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and Incentives on the Road to
Environmental Justice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1995) (discussing citizens playing the role of private
attorneys general in citizen suits against private entities and citizens performing a mandamus function in
APA suits against agencies).
3. E.g., Adam Babich, Citizen Suits: The Teeth in Public Participation, 25 ENVTL. L. REP.
10141 (1995); Jeffrey Kahn, Zoya's Standing Problem, or, When Should the Constitution Follow the
Flag?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 673, 697 (2010); Douglas 0. Waikart, Report of the Committee on the
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This Note argues that environmental privatization programs-a separate
and seemingly unrelated measure designed to promote environmental
conservation-may provide a partial solution to the standing problem in citizen
enforcement and APA review actions. Environmental privatization programs
create private tradable rights to environmental resources and are designed to
force users to internalize the costs of depleting common resources. These
programs have been immensely popular, and two Presidents have instructed
regulators to prefer these programs as an alternative to direct regulation.4
Because these programs require all users to purchase rights to use the resource,
and the price of the resource depends on the resource's aggregate availability,
each tradable right's value necessarily depends on the total abundance of the
resource as well as on competition in the market for the resource. Any action
that either threatens the resource's aggregate abundance or impacts the market
for resource rights threatens the holder's concrete individual interest.
To date, no one has considered the relationship between tradable rights
and standing. Many commentators have lamented standing barriers to citizen
enforcement. The closest any commentator has come to addressing this
relationship is Cass Sustein's argument that federal courts should accept
jurisdiction over citizen suits because Congress, in granting any citizen the
right to sue to enforce a regulatory statute, effectively confers a "property right
in a certain state of affairs" on citizens, which they should be able to vindicate
in court.
My argument builds on this notion, but it avoids several problems in
Sunstein's characterization of citizen suit provisions as themselves conferring a
Environment, 19 ENERGY L.J. 181, 195 (1998) ("Standing to sue has been a 'perennial' issue in
environmental citizen suit litigation."); William Glaberson, Novel Antipollution Tool Is Being Upset by
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1999, at Al; see also Linda Greenhouse, Who Stands for Standing?, N.Y.
TIMES OPINIONATOR BLOG (Sept. 23, 2010, 9:44 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/who-stands-for-standing (asserting that "raising the
barriers to standing is a core part of the[] agenda" of Chief Justice Roberts and his allies, and that "the
question of standing" is being made "one of the hot legal topics of the coming months or even years").
4. President Clinton issued an Executive Order instructing agencies to "identify and assess
available alternatives to direct regulation ... such as . .. marketable permits." Executive Order 12866 of
September 30, 1993: Regulatory Planning and Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). President
Obama reiterated this instruction. Executive Order 13563 of January 18, 2011: Improving Regulation
and Regulatory Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011). Many regulators at the federal and state
level have opted for tradable rights approach. For instance, the EPA has pioneered water quality trading
with twenty-five programs creating private tradable water pollution permits. EPA, WATER QUALITY
TRADING EVALUATION: FINAL REPORT 2 (Oct. 2008), available at
http://www.epa.gov/evaluate/pdf/wqt.pdf
5. Cass Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries ", and Article III,
91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 191, 235 (1992) ("Invasion of that property right is the relevant injury ... [the
court] would be faced with a suit brought by property holders equipped with causes of action.").
However, Sunstein did not connect this idea with environmental privatization programs or private rights
to environmental resources. Further, his account seems to suggest creating a property right that would
give holders an independent cause of action against the government when the right is violated. I am not
suggesting the creation of a separate cause of action outside citizen suits or APA actions, but rather
proposing a means of meeting standing requirements in these existing causes of action.
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property right.6 Additionally, my objective differs from Sunstein's argument,
which seems to be that courts should not impose an individualized injury
requirement in public interest citizen suits, thus defending the constitutional
legitimacy of courts hearing non-individualized public grievances in the
context of citizen suits. Instead, my objective is to find a way for citizen
plaintiffs to meet individualized interest requirements as they currently exist.
My theory reconciles Congress's goals of promoting citizen enforcement with
the courts' refusal to adjudicate general public grievances. This Note argues
that existing Tradable-rights programs have, in a moderated sense, given
practicable effect to Sunstein's description by creating concrete and
individualized private interests in enforcing compliance with, and
implementation of, environmental protection legislation.7
Providing a basis for standing in citizen suits and APA review
proceedings, tradable rights could optimize the benefits of citizen participation
while ameliorating many of the concerns associated with it. Using tradable
rights as a basis for standing would provide access to the courts for interested
citizens who may have more information, motivation, or funding to enforce
environmental protection legislation than the executive branch. At the same
time, because tradable resource rights holders have a concrete financial interest
whose value is automatically linked to a resource's overall abundance, and the
rights are necessarily scarce, plaintiffs would still meet constitutional
requirements that include showing a concrete individualized interest. This
would also ameliorate prudential concerns about excessive citizen enforcement
actions and guarantee that litigants have a sufficient and concrete financial
stake in the controversy to ensure zealous advocacy. Because a plaintiff holding
tradable rights would need to show that the regulatory decision will likely result
in actual devaluation of her tradable rights, litigants would be unable to bring
citizen suits based on violations of technical procedural requirements that do
6. My argument avoids two shortcomings of Sunstein's claim. First, Sunstein suggests
recognizing new abstract property interests conferred on all members of the public indistinguishably,
thereby disregarding the Court's Article III standing jurisprudence requiring that a plaintiff have an
individualized interest apart from the public interest. Second, in suggesting a cause of action is based on
private property, Sunstein's argument potentially implicates the Takings Clause and other types of
financial liability for regulatory decisions. My argument avoids both of these problems by focusing on
publicly attainable interests in enforcement of regulatory legislation that establish an individualized
interest apart from the public interest at large, but are defined in less absolute terms than private property
rights which might implicate takings liability.
7. No court has directly addressed the question of whether ownership of tradable rights is
sufficient for standing to sue based on violations or failures to regulate the underlying resource. In the
most informative case, the plaintiff was an environmental organization whose main purpose was
promoting the use of tradable emissions programs. Clean Air Mkts. Grp. v. Pataki, 194 F. Supp. 2d 147,
155-57 (N.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd, 338 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2003). Based on one member's ownership of
tradable emissions allowances, the plaintiff organization was found to have standing to challenge
government action that devalued emissions allowances in contravention of the Clean Air Act. This case
strongly suggests that ownership of private rights in environmental resources would be a sufficient basis
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not actually threaten to harm the resource or the market for it. This discussion
only considers causes of action under the APA (which does not waive
sovereign immunity for damages actions) and citizen suit provisions, where the
principal available remedy is forced compliance. Because these statutes permit
only prospective enforcement and not monetary damages, each violation can
only result in one remedy: an injunction. Therefore, this proposal does not run
the risk of significantly increasing the total number of enforcement actions
against government or private actors or of provoking multiple suits on the basis
of one illegal action or private violation.
This Note proceeds in five Parts. Part I addresses the problem that
animates this discussion-agency failure to fully or properly implement
regulatory legislation, particularly environmental protection legislation-and
congressional attempts to counteract this through citizen enforcement and APA
review actions. Part II describes how these enforcement mechanisms have been
limited by constitutional standing requirements of individual interest and
causation/redressability. Part III discusses environmental privatization
programs. Part IV sets out the argument that holding tradable environmental
rights would enable holders to meet standing requirements by (a) conferring a
concrete and particularized individual interest akin to those consistently
recognized as sufficient for standing, (b) establishing a causal nexus between
the regulatory failure and threat to the plaintiff s individualized interest, and (c)
bringing holders within the "zone of interests" protected by legislation
governing the underlying resource. Part V considers several case studies
describing how existing Tradable-rights programs would likely confer standing
on rights holders and what types of actions plaintiffs might bring under existing
regimes. The Conclusion argues that, in addition to expanding the availability
of citizen participation, using tradable rights as a basis for standing would
maximize the benefit of citizen participation while avoiding many of the
drawbacks associated with it.
I. Attempts To Counteract Agency Inaction: Citizen Suits and APA Review
Proceedings
This Part discusses two congressional measures to enhance citizen
participation in agency oversight-citizen enforcement actions and APA
review actions-and briefly addresses the benefits and drawbacks associated
with these mechanisms for citizen participation.8 The latter part of the twentieth
century saw increasing distrust of federal agencies and awareness of the
potential for agency capture or laxness, leading to inadequate enforcement of
8. The following discussion of citizen participation in agency oversight does not aspire to
exhaust the topic or to argue comprehensively in favor of citizen participation. This Note seeks to
discuss the potential benefits and drawbacks to citizen participation and explain how tradable rights as a
basis for standing may be a compromise that maximizes benefits while ameliorating drawbacks.
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regulatory legislation.9  Many commentators have observed the inherent
shortcomings in relying on agencies alone to enforce regulatory legislation:
agencies become complacent in oversight; they develop lasting relationships
with industry entities; they struggle to police the wide range of discrete or
secretive violations that may occur; and they face budgetary and personnel
constraints that require selective enforcement in the face of widespread
violations. 10 Administrative agencies interact with the same regulated entities
over long periods. This allows them to develop relationships with the regulated
parties and build up expertise about the regulated industry. However, these
lasting relationships may also allow agencies to become "captured" by the
interests and members of the regulated industry, or at least create the hazard
that officials may lose perspective in increasing attachment to their positions or
to the concerns of one isolated industry. Furthermore, agency officials, lacking
a strong personal stake in zealous enforcement of regulation, may become
ineffective. 1
The potential for agency failure was illustrated in the Exxon Valdez oil
spill, in which government regulators failed to address violations of safety
requirements that were known before the oil spill occurred. 12 This also
happened in the 1979 Ixtoc oil spill in Mexico's Bay of Campeche' 3 and again
9. WILLIAM DRAYTON, AMERICA'S ToxIc PROTECTION GAP: THE COLLAPSE OF COMPLIANCE
WITH THE NATION'S TOXICS LAW 6 (1984) (describing the perception that the Reagan Administration,
generally viewed as unsympathetic towards environmental regulation, permitted a "collapse of
compliance with the nation's environmental protection laws"); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard Stewart,
Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1344 (1985) (discussing the "egregious failure
of the EPA and associated state agencies to enforce the laws on the books in a timely and effective
way"); Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment
of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 870-71 (1985) (commenting
on the "perception among environmental groups that the first Reagan Administration was rapidly
undermining compliance with environmental laws"); see also William L. Andreen, The Evolution of
Water Pollution Control in the United States-State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972, Part 1, 22
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 194-99 (2003) (discussing the failure of government to implement and enforce
earlier water pollution control efforts that preceded the enactment of modem water pollution control
legislation providing for citizen suits); Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in Statutory Preclusions
Against Successive Environmental Enforcement Actions by EPA and Citizens-Part One: Statutory Bars
in Citizen Suit Provisions, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 401 (2004) (describing Congress's desire to ensure
comprehensive enforcement of environment statutes by leveraging the EPA, states, and private citizens).
10. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 745-47 (1972) ("[T]he pressures on agencies for
favorable action one way or the other are enormous. . . . The federal agencies of which I speak are not
venal or corrupt. But they are notoriously under the control of powerful interests who manipulate them
through advisory committees, or friendly working relations, or who have that natural affinity with the
agency which in time develops between the regulator and the regulated.") (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
11. See Babich, supra note 3; Miller, supra note 9; Sunstein, supra note 5; Ian Urbina, U.S.
Said To Allow Drilling Without Needed Permits, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2010, at Al (discussing the
Minerals Management Service's failure to obtain permits as required by the Endangered Species Act and
Marine Mammal Protection Act before allowing drilling in the Gulf of Mexico).
12. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Facing a Time of Counter-Revolution-The Kepone Incident and a
Review ofFirst Principles, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 657, 699-701 (1995).
13. Oil Spill Q & A with Earthjustice Attorney David Guest: "I Wasn't Surprised At All",
EARTHJUSTICE (June 23, 2010), http://earthjustice.org/features/oil-spill-q-a-with-earthjustice-attomey-
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in the 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. The Minerals Management
Service's (MMS) records show that before the 2010 Gulf spill, it allowed
hundreds of drilling projects to proceed without first obtaining the permits
required under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the Marine Mammal
Protection Act and without ensuring the rig's compliance with blowout
prevention safety standards. Scientists inside and outside MMS were aware of
MMS's ongoing failure to enforce the law.14 Interior Secretary Ken Salazar
testified before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee that his
agency had been lax in overseeing drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, stating that
MMS must be "clean[ed] up" and that there were "bad apples" in the agency.
President Obama stated that government regulators had a "cozy relationship"
with the energy industry.' 6 This event illustrates the potential for agencies to
experience lapses in complying with their legal obligations and the need for
oversight of agency implementation. It also shows that citizens are often aware
of regulatory failures or shortcomings before disasters occur. Recognizing this
reality, Congress has provided two distinct mechanisms to enable citizens to
participate in enforcing compliance with regulatory legislation: citizen
enforcement actions and review of agency action under the APA." It is
important to note that these are two different procedures enabling citizen
participation. A citizen enforcement action refers to a suit against a private
violator pursuant to an explicit statutory provision empowering citizens to bring
such actions. An APA review action is a suit against the agency seeking to
compel the agency itself to comply with its mandate.
Citizen suit provisions provide a cause of action for any citizen to bring an
enforcement action against a private, state, or local entity that fails to comply
with regulatory legislation, so long as enforcement is not already underway.' 8
Once a citizen brings an enforcement proceeding, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has a right to intervene and prosecute the violation on behalf of
david-guest-i-wasn-t-surprised-at-all (describing how regulators failed to verify that the Ixtoc rig's
blowout preventer mechanism met safety standards).
14. Urbina, supra note I1; Terry Winckler, Suit Filed To End Reckless Approach to Offshore
Oil Drilling, EARTHJUSTICE: UNEARTHED (May 18, 2010, 12:37 PM),
http://unearthed.earthjustice.org/blog/2010-may/suit-filed-end-reckless-approach-offshore-oil-drilling.
15. H. Josef Hebert & Frederic J. Frommer, Associated Press, Interior Secretary




17. 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2006).
18. The following environmental protection statutes all have citizen suit provisions: Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (1) (2006); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §
1540(g) (1) (A) (2006); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (1)
(2006); Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1) (2006); Clean Water Act 33
U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1) (2006); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuary Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (1)
(2006); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6305(a) (2006); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42
U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1) (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1) (2006); and Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1349(a) (1) (2006).
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the government. Citizen enforcers may seek penalties and orders requiring
compliance and mitigation of past violations. Any penalties assessed against
violators are paid to the U.S. Treasury, not the citizen who brought the
enforcement proceeding, though plaintiffs' counsel may receive attorney's
fees.'9
A second, separate means for citizen oversight is section 702 of the APA,
providing that any "person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."20 A party challenging an
agency's misinterpretation or implementation of a statute or failure to take
action as a statute requires should seek review under the APA. 2 1 APA actions
differ from citizen suits. Citizen suits are a "means by which private parties
may enforce the substantive provisions of the [regulatory statute] against
regulated parties-both private entities and Government agencies".22 Where a
statute's citizen suit provision might only be invoked to challenge actual
violations, an APA review action provides an avenue for challenging the way
an agency implements the statute, including the reasonableness of its
determinations, regulations, and interpretations under the statute, and failure to
take action when the statute suggests it should.23 The APA thus also enables
interested citizens to bring suits to compel a lax agency to perform its duties
generally with respect to other regulated parties, or to alter its determinations
and regulations implementing the statute if they are unreasonable or do not
serve the purpose of the enabling legislation.
A. Benefits of Citizen Enforcement and APA Review Actions
Citizen suits have been recognized as a valuable means of promoting
compliance with regulatory legislation.24 The public provides a broader source
19. Wendy Naysnerski & Tom Tietenberg, Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 68
LAND ECON. 28 (1992); Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement:
Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81 (2002).
20. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). The APA provides a right to judicial
review of all "final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court," and applies
universally "except to the extent that (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law." The basis for judicial review granted under the APA is separate
and distinct from that granted by a citizen suit provision. Ifa plaintiff does not have a right to sue based
on a citizen suit provision, or the plaintiff's claim based on a citizen suit provision fails, he may seek
review separately under this section of the APA. Id. §§ 701(a), 704; Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 175
(1997); Alliance To Save Mattaponi v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2007).
21. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 173.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 173-75 (finding that plaintiffs cannot challenge an agency's implementation of the
ESA under the statute's citizen suit provision, but they can do so with an APA review action, because
the causes of action set forth in the ESA's citizen suit provision are not exclusive and do not supplant
those provided by the APA).
24. See Report of the Committee on the Environment, 19 ENERGY L.J. 181, 192 (1998)
("Environmental citizen suits are a very significant aspect of federal environmental enforcement
litigation in terms of both the frequency of these suits and the severity of the sanctions imposed ...
208
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of experience, interests, expertise, and funding, than is available in government,
and may in some circumstances be better positioned to enforce compliance
with environmental regulation than the executive branch. Citizens' interests are
more detached and diverse than those of agencies: they interact with a regulated
industry in a range of scenarios and have more exposure to the industry's
conduct.
Citizen suits have been recognized as effective means of supplementing
agency enforcement. The public may in some circumstances be better
positioned to enforce compliance with environmental regulation than the
executive branch. Citizen enforcement has been shown to increase when
agency enforcement decreases,2 5 and the number of citizen enforcement actions
brought against violators is about fivefold more than those brought by the
federal government.26 The availability of citizen enforcement actions also
incentivizes firms to comply or cooperate with overseeing agencies because of
the potential cost of a citizen enforcement action, which is likely to result in
higher penalties as well as an award of attorneys' fees.27 Because citizen
enforcement and APA review proceedings are publicly visible, they call
attention to and delegitimize non-compliance in a way that is much more severe
than internal discipline or private negotiations and bargains.2 8 EPA officials
have testified in favor of citizen enforcement actions as complementing their
ability to fulfill their duties by increasing resources for prosecuting violations
and encouraging regulated entities to seek compliance. Citizen enforcement
has played a large role in execution of environmental protection legislation,
most notably the Clean Water Act (CWA). The effective deployment of citizen
suits has given rise to regional citizen organizations dedicated entirely to
enforcing the Act in their local ecological settings.30
citizen suit enforcement under . . . federal environmental statutes, such as the CAA, the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act (EPCRA), is growing.").
25. Naysnerski & Tietenberg, supra note 19, at 35 ("While federal enforcement was
decreasing in the early 1980s, private enforcement was picking up the slack.").
26. David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System: Can
Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the United States, the States, and
Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1609 (1995).
27. Zinn, supra note 19, at 135.
28. Id. at 97-98.
29. Miller, supra note 9, at 411 & n.39 (citing The Water Quality Act of 1994 and Issues
Related to Clean Water Act Reauthorization: Hearings on H.R. 3948 Before the Subcomm. on Water
Res. and Env't of the H. Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., 103d Cong. 290 (1994) (statement of Carol
M. Browner, Administrator, EPA); Pending Clean Water Act Legislation: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Env't and Natural Res. of the H. Comm. on Merch. Marine and Fisheries, 103d Cong.
212-13 (1994) (statement of Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator for Enforcement, EPA)).
30. Michael R. Lozeau, Tailoring Citizen Enforcement to an Expanding Clean Water Act: The
San Francisco Baykeeper Model, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 429, 442-43 & n.51 (1998) (discussing
Hudson RiverKeeper, a program established by Hudson River Fishermen's Association that "maintains
a steady docket of citizen enforcement cases based exclusively on pollution of the watershed of the
Hudson River").
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APA actions share many of the advantages of citizen suits. The APA
provides for suits to challenge an agency's implementation of its enabling
statute, such as decisions to adopt rules, policies, or courses of action, without
complying with statutory procedures or adequately considering interests that
are impacted by those actions, or when implementation arguably deviates from
the purpose of the agency's enabling statute. In the context of APA actions,
citizens' diverse interests, knowledge, expertise, and interactions with agencies
provide the same advantages and ensure that a more complete range of interests
and factors are considered in agency decisions that implement and interpret
regulatory legislation. By providing a means for drawing out and considering
the concerns of citizens with broad interests and interactions with agencies,
APA review proceedings counteract the tendency of agencies to become
narrowly focused on the area they are charged with regulating and neglect other
pertinent concerns or interests.
B. Arguments Against Citizen Participation
Critics of citizen participation-both through citizen enforcement and
APA review actions-advance prudential and constitutional arguments against
broad grants of standing for public enforcement of federal law. Critics of
citizen enforcement actions argue that they thwart agencies' enforcement
discretion, which is required because the terms of regulation tend to be over-
inclusive, capturing some desirable or innocent activities within the terms of
the prohibition. They argue that law enforcement has traditionally been at the
discretion of public officers because the inherent over-inclusiveness of legal
prohibitions leads to danger of excessive enforcement against parties whose
activities are really innocent in terms of the harm the law was intended to
prevent.3' This argument assumes that officials are less prone to harmful over-
enforcement because they are better able to evaluate when enforcement is in the
public interest and must enforce selectively due to budgetary constraints.
Citizen enforcers, by contrast, may prosecute every violation of the law,
regardless of whether prosecution in the public interest. This is so, critics argue,
even though citizen plaintiffs do not reap economic benefit from bringing
enforcement actions. 32 Critics argue that citizen enforcement actions' awards of
attorney's fees enable "a self sustaining, remunerative enforcement project,"
where environmental advocates use fee awards from citizen suits to search for
other violations and finance more enforcement actions.33 This criticism does
31. Michael S. Greve, Private Enforcement, Private Rewards: How Environmental Citizen
Suits Became an Entitlement Program, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE
REWARDS 105, 106 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds. 1992).
32. Environmental statutes providing for citizen suits prohibit citizen-plaintiffs from collecting
awards, bounties, or penalties paid. These are collected by the U.S. Treasury. Further, statutes providing
for citizen suits make the award of attomey's fees discretionary. Id. at 106.
33. Id. at 111 (arguing that citizen suits enable "scores of actions, not over substantive
environmental violations but over violations of the voluminous paperwork requirements, . . . [that]
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not adequately support the postulation that citizen enforcers would prosecute
trivial violations of environmental laws when an executive enforcer would not.
Considering that citizen enforcers have nothing to gain monetarily from
successfully prosecuting a trivial violation, it is difficult to see why any rational
actor would expend finite resources like time and effort to enforce an empty
technical provision of a regulatory statute against a third party. This seems
particularly implausible of citizen enforcers who presumably are typically
motivated by ideological or public interest and thus especially concerned with
achieving the public purpose of regulation rather than fulfilling the technical
letter of the regulatory statute.
These critics also attack the perceived legitimacy of punishment pursuant
to citizen enforcement, arguing that "officers of the state are intuitively the
most legitimate entities for punishment in light of their constitutional status and
universally recognized authority in the social community." 34 This criticism
ignores the crucial role of state authority in citizen suits. After all, in a citizen
suit, the nature of a violation, the legal duties breached, and the punishment
assigned, are all determined by the legislature which originally enacted the
statute and the court that adjudicates the citizen suit. In this context, the citizen
enforcer acts merely as an instrument of the legislature in bringing potential
violations of environmental law to the attention of the courts. Hence, the
entities creating and imposing punishment are entities of "constitutional status"
with "universally recognized authority in the social community."
In addition, objections that citizen suits force litigation by foreclosing
agency efforts to negotiate or settle with regulated entities, and that citizen suits
undermine cooperative federalism,35 also seem inapposite. First, citizen suits
are only permitted upon demonstration that the agency has not already
undertaken enforcement initiatives, either through federal agents or cooperation
with state enforcers. Hence, the implementing agency and any cooperating state
agencies have the primary enforcement prerogative. Enforcement initiatives
can include settlement or negotiation with regulated entities. Indeed, as noted
above, the threat of citizen suits has actually enhanced cooperation and
negotiation between agencies and regulated entities, because the threat of
citizen suits has encouraged regulated entities to seek compliance enforcement
from agencies themselves to avoid costly enforcement actions. 36
generate tens of thousands of dollars in attorneys fees and credit projects, [but that] produce no
discernable environmental benefits"); see also Robert F. Blomquist, Rethinking the Citizen as
Prosecutor Model of Environmental Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act: Some Overlooked
Problems of Outcome-Independent Values, 22 GA. L. REV. 337, 370, 410 (1988) (arguing that "officers
of the state, by virtue of their theoretical resources, flexibility, concern for the aggregate public good,
and accountability to a wide constituency, are in the best position to craft effective punishment" and
citizen suits replace career enforcers with narrowly focused members of the public "who have little
appreciation of larger concerns that should inform a particular enforcement approach").
34. Blomquist, supra note 33, at 370.
35. Id. at 409-10.
36. See Zinn, supra note 19 and accompanying discussion.
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On a more fundamental level, commentators object that broad citizen
participation in policing private and agency compliance violates the separation
of powers and the provisions of Article II. These critics argue that permitting
any citizen to bring enforcement and APA review actions without suffering an
individual injury would confer on citizens the prosecutorial authority that is the
sole province of the executive branch. Conferring a right upon citizens to
prosecute violations of the law or agency failure to enforce the law would
undermine the executive branch's exclusive purview over execution of the
laws.37 These critics argue that the Take Care Clause gives the executive
branch the prerogative to enforce the law in the name of the public by
analogizing to actions to vindicate public interest in regulatory enforcement to
a nationwide class action. Because the executive branch is vested with the
responsibility of enforcing the law on behalf of the public, these commentators
argue that it is unconstitutional for individual citizens to do so.
This criticism is flawed. Vesting the executive branch with the prerogative
of enforcing the law on behalf of the public does not entitle the executive
branch to choose not to do so.38 Citizen participation does not disrupt the
executive branch's authority or responsibility to enforce the law. Rather, citizen
suit plaintiffs may only intervene in instances when the executive branch has
expressly opted not to enforce: these plaintiffs must show that the executive
branch has not already taken action. Moreover, the executive branch always has
notice and the opportunity to intervene once a citizen suit is filed.
Critics' second constitutional argument is that the courts that adjudicate
suits brought by citizens without a concrete individual interest apart from the
public's general interest in regulatory compliance permit suits that are not
"cases" or "controversies" as required by Article I. 39 However, it is
questionable whether actions based on the general public interest in regulatory
enforcement are really contrary to the original understanding of Article III.
37. Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizens Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 1793, 1794 & n.9 (1993) ("Article II prohibits Congress from vesting in private parties the power
to bring enforcement actions on behalf of the public without allowing for sufficient executive control
over the litigation.... [T]he Executive should redress unindividuated injuries because no single citizen
should have any greater right than any other to vindicate injuries shared equally by the public as a
whole. We believe that an analogy to a nationwide class action is apt only the Executive can be the class
representative to vindicate the collective interests of the nation.").
38. Courts have long held that while charged with enforcement, the executive branch is not
empowered to decline to enforce the law. The executive branch's duty to enforce the law does not
encompass the authority to choose not to enforce it. This principle is implicit in the Court's invalidation
of the Line Item Veto Act, which permitted the President to selectively decline to enforce the law would
enable the President to amend or repeal an act of Congress in violation of Article I. Clinton v. City of
New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). If Congress cannot authorize the executive branch to decline to execute
portions of a law, then the executive branch certainly cannot decline to enforce the law against
Congress's will.
39. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983); Charles S. Abell, Note, Ignoring the Trees for the Forests:
How the Citizen Suit Provision of the Clean Water Act Violates the Constitution's Separation of Powers
Principle, 81 VA. L. REv. 1957, 1985 (1995) (discussing the difficulties of establishing an injury-in-fact
without a direct interest in a violation).
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There is substantial evidence that at the time of the framing, courts accepted
jurisdiction over actions by members of the public to compel officers to
perform their public duties, as well as qui tam actions or informers' suits. In
1875, the Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction over a suit brought by merchants
pursuant to a statute granting the courts jurisdiction to hear suits seeking
mandamus to compel railroad companies to operate as required by law. The
Court observed that plaintiffs had "no interest other than such that belonged to
others" and sought to enforce "a duty to the public generally," but "[t]here is,
we think, a decided preponderance of American authority in favor of the
doctrine, that private persons may move for a mandamus to enforce a public
duty. . . .,40 Furthermore, as members of the first Congress, the Framers passed
legislation providing for qui tam actions and included jurisdiction over them in
the Judiciary Act of 1789.41
Despite this evidence that suits to vindicate the general public interest are
consistent with the original understanding of Article III, the currently accepted
understanding of Article III requires litigants to have particular individualized
interests in a controversy. Thus, critics of citizen participation lament citizen
plaintiffs' lack of individualized interest in enforcing regulation against third
parties as a violation of Article III. Justice Scalia has consistently argued
against citizen participation via the courts, stating that "vindication of the rule
of law-'the undifferentiated public interest' in faithful execution of the law"42
is not the proper province of the citizen plaintiff, and that "courts need to
accord greater weight than they have in recent times to the traditional
requirement that the plaintiffs alleged injury be a particularized one, which
sets him apart from the citizenry at large.' 43 However, whether a concrete
individualized interest is (or should be) necessary for adjudication under Article
III is of little consequence to my argument, since this Note argues that tradable
rights satisfy an individualized interest requirement.
40. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343, 354-55 (1875) (citing People ex rel. Case v.
Collins, 19 Wend. 56 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837)) (articulating that where public rights are at stake, the people
are the real party to the litigation, and every citizen has the right, if not the duty, to interfere and see that
a public offense or grievance is remedied).
41. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774-78 (2000);
Raoul Berger, Standing To Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J.
816, 817-819 (1969); Louis L. Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REv. 633, 635-36 (1971) [hereinafter
Jaffe, Standing Again]; Louis L. Jaffe, Standing To Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 1265, 1270-71 (1961) [hereinafter Jaffe, Standing To Secure]; Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of
Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1371, 1407-08, 1410 (1988)
[hereinafter Winter, The Metaphor ofStanding]; Steven L. Winter, What IfJustice Scalia Took the Rule
ofLaw Seriously?, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 155, 156 (2001) [hereinafter Winter, Scalia].
42. Winter, Scalia, supra note 41, at 157-58 (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't,
523 U.S. 83, 106 (1998)).
43. Scalia, supra note 39, at 881-82.
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II. Standing Doctrine Limiting Citizen Participation
This Part provides background on how standing doctrine impedes
plaintiffs seeking to enforce environmental regulation. A discussion of recent
standing cases illustrates the obstacles faced by environmental plaintiffs and
provides context for the latter part of this discussion on how holding tradable
rights might avert barriers to standing.
There are two categories of standing requirements: constitutional and
prudential. Constitutional standing requirements are justified as being
necessary to ensure the litigation meets Article III's case-or-controversy
requirement.44 The Court maintains that in order for a court constitutionally to
accept jurisdiction over a claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he is
threatened by an injury in fact, which is an invasion of a legally protected
interest that is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent (rather than
"conjectural" or "hypothetical"); (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to
defendants' actions (causation); and (3) it is likely that the injury will be
redressed by favorable decision (redressability). The second and third prongs
are both encompassed by the term "causal nexus."45 The Court has held that
because these requirements are constitutional limits on courts' jurisdiction that
Congress cannot waive, Congress may not grant a cause of action to plaintiffs
who cannot meet these requirements.4 6 Citizens seeking to bring citizen suits
and APA review actions have faced difficulty establishing that (a) they have a
concrete and particular interest in the resource; and (b) the regulatory failure
with respect to a third party or the resource on aggregate will cause direct harm
to their particular individualized interest. 4 7
Plaintiffs additionally face prudential standing requirements: "judicially
self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction" that include "the
general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule
barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in
the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall
within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked."" Since these
limitations are judicially constructed, and not constitutionally mandated,
Congress may waive these requirements by granting a cause of action to
44. Id.
45. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561-62 (1992) (analyzing causation and
redressability together).
46. Id. at 576-78.
47. See discussion infra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
48. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams.
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982)). Here the "zone of interest"
standard is articulated as a component of prudential standing requirements. It appears that after Ass'n of
Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), the zone of interests
requirement was incorporated into prudential standing requirements, as opposed to being considered a
separate statutory requirement under the APA specifically.
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plaintiffs who do not satisfy them.49 Hence they have less impact on citizen
plaintiffs bringing suit based on a citizen suit provision or an APA cause of
action. However, plaintiffs bringing suit under the APA must meet its statutory
"zone of interests" requirement.o
Plaintiffs bringing citizen enforcement or APA review actions have been
inhibited mainly by constitutional standing requirements: they struggle to show
that an agency's failure to implement, or a third party's failure to comply with,
regulatory legislation is likely to cause harm to a specific portion of the
resource in which they have a particular individualized interest.5 1 Two recent
cases in which environmental plaintiffs sought review of agency action, Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildife52 and Summers v. Earth Island Institute53 illustrate this
problem. These cases, coupled with the later discussion of tradable rights,
illustrate the types of plaintiffs that may be able to obtain standing through
tradable rights, though they would not otherwise meet standing requirements.
Lujan arose under the ESA's requirement that the Department of the
Interior issue Environmental Impact Statements before undertaking any project
that may impact endangered species. The plaintiffs, members of a group called
Defenders of Wildlife, studied endangered species in the impacted areas of Sri
Lanka and Egypt. They sought review under the APA of the Department of the
Interior's determination that the ESA was inapplicable to projects outside the
United States, and Interior's failure to issue Environmental Impact Statements
before undertaking development projects in Egypt and Sri Lanka that
threatened the endangered species there. Though the plaintiffs had visited the
habitats in the past and intended to return to the countries to study the habitats
in the future, the Court struggled to see the plaintiffs' individualized interests in
the impacted habitats. Stating that the violation "must affect the plaintiff in a
personal and individual way" apart from their "special interest in the subject,"
the Court looked for tangible or concrete individual interests, suggesting
standing requirements would likely be met if the Plaintiffs had actual plans,
itineraries, or plane tickets to return to the areas, the value of which would be
49. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (noting that prudential standing requirements
"can be modified or abrogated by Congress"); Warth v. Seldon, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) ("Congress
may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing
rules.").
50. Plaintiffs bringing APA review actions are required to demonstrate that their individual
interests are "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in
question." Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163.
51. See Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty Years of
Law and Politics, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs., Autumn 1991, at 249; Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury
in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 299 (2008); Sunstein, supra note 5; see also infra
notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
52. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
53. 555 U.S. 488 (2009).
215
Yale Journal on Regulation
compromised if the endangered species they were travelling to see went
extinct. 54 Absent these interests, the plaintiffs did not have standing to sue.
Proving causation and redressability tends to be particularly problematic
where the plaintiff's claim rests on an agency's failure to regulate a third party.
The Lujan court also captured the particular difficulties plaintiffs in citizen
suits and APA review actions face in establishing a causal nexus:
When, a plaintiff's asserted injury arises from the government's allegedly unlawful regulation
(or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is needed. In that circumstance, causation
and redressability ordinarily hinge on the response of the regulated (or regulable) third party to
the government action or inaction-and perhaps on the response of others as well. . . . Thus,
when the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or inaction he challenges,
standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily 'substantially more difficult' to establish.
5
The Lujan plaintiffs also argued that they were entitled to sue under the
ESA's citizen suit provision "to enjoin any person, including the United States
and any other governmental instrumentality or agency . .. who is alleged to be
in violation of any provision of this chapter."56 The Court held that ESA's
citizen suit provision was unconstitutional as applied to Lujan because it
purported to grant standing where plaintiffs did not meet the case-or-
controversy requirement of Article III. It stated that a plaintiff must show more
than "a generally available grievance about government claiming only harm to
his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and
laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it
does the public at large."57 The Court emphasized that "[v]indicating the public
interest (including the public interest in government observance of the
Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive."58
Following Lujan, the Court's decision in Summers enhanced the difficulty
for environmental plaintiffs by rejecting "probablistic standing" based on a
"realistic likelihood" that a plaintiffs individual interest in the resource would
be effected because the agency's actions threatened the resource on whole,
even if it was not possible to identify which specific area or portion of the
resource would be damaged.59 The plaintiffs in Summers, an organization of
54. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("[lt may seem trivial to require that [plaintiffs] acquire airline tickets to the project sites or announce a
date certain upon which they will return.").
55. Id. at 561-62.
56. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (2006).
57. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74 (Scalia, J.).
58. Id. at 577. The trouble with Justice Scalia's deference to the democratic branches
argument is that the citizen suit provisions were enacted to ensure that the will of the democratic
majority was carried out. Invalidating the legislature's decision to allow for citizen suits seems to be
ironically invalidating a democratic decision of the legislature in the name of deference to the
democratically elected branches.
59. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009). See Bradford Mank, Summers v.
Earth Island Institute Rejects Probablistic Standing, But a 'Realistic Threat' of Harm Is a Better
Standing Test, 40 ENv. L. 89 (2010); William Funk, "Probabalistic Injury": The Odds Aren't Good,
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frequent National Forest visitors, claimed that the U.S. Forest Service was
violating and effectively repealing a statute requiring it to provide for public
notice, comment, and appeal, on upcoming projects by determining that the
notice requirement did not apply to projects involving less than two hundred
fifty acres, then undertaking a majority of its projects in increments of less than
two hundred fifty acres. Though the Court acknowledged that the agency's
action may be illegal and harmful to the forest on whole, it found that none of
the forest-frequenting plaintiffs were able to prove that the U.S. Forest Service
was about to destroy a specific part of the forest that they had concrete plans to
use, and therefore could not establish that they were facing imminent threat to
their individualized interest.60 Justice Breyer's dissent argued that a plaintiff
who had visited seventy National Forests hundreds of times, and who would
continue doing so, should have standing based on probabilistic injury-a
"threat of future harm [that] may be realistic even where the plaintiff cannot
specify precise times, dates, and GPS coordinates." 6' Rejecting this notion of
standing based on a high probability of injury, the Summers majority explained
that it would not assume that a plaintiff would
stumble across a project tract unlawfully subject to the regulations, but also that the tract is
about to be developed by the Forest Service in a way that harms his recreational interests, and
that he would have [used the public comment and objection process and] commented on the
project but for the regulation,6
implying that a plaintiff would have to prove as much. Summers created a
Catch-22 whereby the U.S. Forest Service's illegal actions (failing to provide
notice about upcoming projects) perpetually precluded plaintiffs from having
standing to challenge those actions. Since the U.S. Forest Service did not
provide notice of future projects, it was nearly impossible to identify particular
tracts of forest that were about to be impacted, or, consequently, to identify an
individual plaintiff with an interest in a specific tract that was threatened.
This Summers problem-rejection of probabilistic injury-potentially
thwarted suits challenging MMS's notorious failure to regulate oil rigs in the
Gulf of Mexico before the 2010 oil spill occurred. It would have likely been
possible to establish that the Gulf on whole faced the imminent threat of an oil
spill because the 1979 Ixtoc oil spill in Mexico's Bay of Campeche was caused
in exactly the same way: by MMS permitting a drilling rig without verifying
JOTWELL (May 10, 2010), http://adlaw.jotwell.com/probabilistic-injury-the-odds-arent-good ("The
problem according to the [Summers] majority was that there was no particular identified member for
whom it could be said that he would indeed have his recreational enjoyment destroyed by such a timber
sale. The dissent argued that there was a realistic likelihood that one or more members of the
organizations would in fact have their recreational enjoyment destroyed by a such a sale, even if the
particular member or members could not be identified at this time.")
60. Summers, 555 U.S. at 492-97.
61. Id. at 506 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 496 (Scalia, J.).
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the adequacy of the rig's blowout prevention mechanisms. It was also known
that MMS had permitted a number of rigs to operate without verifying the
adequacy of blowout preventers,64 and the danger of this was established by the
Mexico Bay spill. Hence, there was a demonstrable likelihood that the Gulf was
threatened by an imminent oil spill-seemingly sufficient to bestow standing
on individuals living around and frequently using the Gulf under the notion of
probabilistic injury articulated in Justice Breyer's Summers dissent. However, it
would have been immensely difficult to identify an individual plaintiff that
could obtain standing under Summers requirements because it would be very
hard to establish which particular individual's interest would be impacted
specifically, given the broad area that could potentially be impacted by an oil
spill. It would be very difficult to identify one specific physical area, tract of
land, or fish population, that was threatened; and it therefore would not be
possible to identify a plaintiff who had a particular individual interest in it.65
These cases illustrate how plaintiffs suing to enforce compliance with
environmental protection legislation, based on causes of action in the APA or
citizen suit provisions, face difficulty meeting Article III standing requirements
of showing that they have a concrete, particularized, individual interest, and
that there is a causal nexus between the challenged action and their particular
interest.
Plaintiffs in APA review proceedings, in addition to establishing Article
III standing, must also meet the statutory/prudential requirement that their
concrete interests "fall[] within the 'zone of interests' sought to be protected by
the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his
complaint." 66 The "zone of interests" test is not intended to be "especially
demanding" and allows a plaintiff to seek review of agency action even if there
is "no indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff."67
Nonetheless, for standing under the APA, a plaintiff must establish that
Congress intended for his interests to be considered or relevant in
implementation of the statute:
[W]here the plaintiff is not itself the subject of the contested regulatory action, the test denies
a right of review if the plaintiff's interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the
purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to
permit the suit. 68
63. Gulf Deep Water Oil Drilling Challenged, EARTHJUSTICE (June 9, 2011),
http://earthjustice.org/news/press/2011/gulf-deep-water-oil-drilling-challenged; Oil Spill Q & A with
Earthjustice Attorney David Guest, supra note 13.
64. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text,
65. Mank, supra note 59 (discussing how Summers's rejection of probabilistic standing may
extend to cases, as with the release of toxic chemicals, in which it is impossible to prove which specific
individuals will be harmed without relying on statistical likelihood of injury); Funk, supra note 59.
66. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 176 (1970).
67. Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399-400 (1987).
68. Id. at 399.
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Plaintiffs seeking to employ regulations designed to protect environmental
or animal welfare have been barred by holdings that their interests are not
within the zone of interests contemplated by the statute. For instance, the
District of Columbia Circuit Court has held that an animal welfare organization
fell outside of the "zone of interests" protected by the Federal Laboratory
Animal Welfare Act and therefore did not have standing to challenge a
69
regulation adopted thereunder by the Department of Agriculture. Ilsofar as
courts have recognized plaintiffs as being within the "zone of interests" of
animal and environmental welfare legislation, they have done so only when
plaintiffs themselves show an interest in not seeing animals suffer that is
obviously related to legislation promoting animal welfare. 70 Courts have also
narrowed the "zone of interests" of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA). In these cases, courts have found plaintiffs with only a financial or
professional interest in compliance with environmental policies prescribed by
the act are not within the "zone of interests" protected by the legislation. 7  This
has restricted plaintiffs who have attempted to rely on financial interests, of
which courts have typically been more accepting, 72  to meet standing
requirements from suing to enforce agency compliance with environmental
procedures.
Some have argued that the Court's 2007 decision granting standing to the
State of Massachusetts to challenge the EPA's failure to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions indicates a liberalization in standing doctrine for environmental
plaintiffs. During this past Term in American Electric Power Co. v.
Connecticut (AEP), four members of an equally divided Court announced they
69. Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 501-02 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
70. Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding
that the plaintiff who frequented an animal exhibition was within the "zone of interests" to challenge
regulations governing the animals' care because "[t]he very purpose of animal exhibitions is,
necessarily, to entertain and educate people; exhibitions make no sense unless one takes the interests of
their human visitors into account").
71. See Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 420 F.3d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 2005) ("We have
long described the zone of interests that NEPA protects as being environmental. Accordingly, we have
consistently held that purely economic interests do not fall within NEPA's zone of interests.") (citations
omitted); Cent. S.D. Co-op. Grazing Dist. v. Sec'y of U.S. Dept. of Agric., 266 F.3d 889, 895-96 (8th
Cir. 2001) ("Economic interests alone are 'clearly not within the zone of interests to be protected by
[NEPA]'.") (quoting Churchill Truck Lines, Inc., v. United States, 533 F.2d 411, 416 (8th Cir. 1976));
Nev. Land Action Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The purpose of NEPA is
to protect the environment, not the economic interests of those adversely affected by agency decisions
.... [A] plaintiff who asserts purely economic injuries does not have standing to challenge an agency
action under NEPA.").
72. See, e.g., Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. at 154 (basing
standing on plaintiffs' financial interests).
73. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Jonathan H. Adler, Warming Up to Climate
Change Litigation, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 63, 69-70 (2007), available at
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/05/21/adler; Michael J. Ritter, Note, Standing in the Way
of Animal Welfare: A Reconsideration of the Zone-of-Interest "Gloss" on the Administrative Procedures
Act, 29 REV. LITIG. 951 (2010).
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would grant standing to the State of Connecticut, seven other States, and the
City of New York to seek an injunction restricting power plants' greenhouse
gas emissions. 7 4 This opinion could also be seen as representative of this trend.
However, the standing analysis of these cases seems not to be a general
departure from or liberalization of previous standing doctrine, but rather a
distinct exception for states bringing suits as on behalf of their citizens as
parens patriae. This develops a unique exception to the concrete and particular
individual interest requirement based on the states' "quasi-sovereign interests"
in protecting their natural resources and the public welfare, both of which are
distinct from the interests of private parties. Accordingly, states have an
"individual" interest in the environmental wellbeing of all of their territory and
do not need to pinpoint a specific physical tract of land that is imminently
threatened. 5 Hence, these cases likely have little bearing on standing for the
citizen plaintiff in citizen enforcement and APA review actions. This is
illustrated by Summers, which occurred two years after Massachusetts v. EPA,
and, as discussed above, enforced standing requirements as stringent as Lujan's
and rejected probabilistic standing, which raised barriers to standing for citizen
plaintiffs. Since Summers occurred between the Massachusetts and AEP
decisions and made standing more difficult for individual citizen plaintiffs,
AEP must be understood as relying particularly on the state standing context.7 6
There is no indication in the AEP decision or otherwise that standing
requirements have been eased for citizen plaintiffs.
This discussion has illustrated how standing requirements have thwarted
citizen plaintiffs from participating in enforcement and oversight of
environmental regulation, despite Congress providing for their participation.
74. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2536 (2011); Nancy G. Millburn,
Connecticut v. AEP Decision, COLUM. J. ENVTL. L., Apr. 12, 2009,
http://www.columbiaenvironmentallaw.org/articles/connecticut-v-aep-decision (discussing the Second
Circuit's decision in favor of plaintiffs' standing as a relaxation of standing requirements).
75. Both Massachusetts v. EPA and AEP v. Connecticut relied on this parens patriae theory
rather than a concrete individualized interest and can be seen as development of a distinct doctrine with
respect to states' standing. For further discussion, see Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater
Standing Rights than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. E.P.A.'s New Standing Test for States, 49
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701 (2008); Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State Standing:
Massachusetts v. EPA, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007); and Kathryn A. Watts & Amy J. Wildermuth,
Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking New Ground on Issues Other than Global Warming, 102 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1029 (2008).
76. If any liberalization in access to courts for citizen plaintiffs resulted from the AEP
decision, it is not in terms of the standing requirements for citizen plaintiffs, but in the determination
that state common-law nuisance claims may not be precluded by federal regulation. This implies that
enabling a plaintiff to meet standing requirements based on tradable rights might enable him to bring a
state common law nuisance claim against a private violator of environmental legislation, assuming the
plaintiffs could meet the elements of a common law nuisance claim (for instance, harming health or
interfering with enjoyment, impacting substantial numbers of people, or causing annoyance to the
average reasonable citizen). Because of the difficulty in meeting the elements of a common-law
nuisance claim based on an imminent environmental threat, and because remedies are restricted to
injunctions, the impact of potentially enabling state law nuisance claims should be minimal, and there is
virtually no "floodgates risk" for the reasons discussed in the conclusion.
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The discussion below outlines programs that create private rights in
environmental resources, and argues that these programs confer upon holders a
private, concrete, and individual interest that is directly and tangibly connected
to the overall abundance of a resource. Holding such a share might avoid the
Summers problem by automatically establishing individualized injury,
causation, and redressability when a regulatory action threatens to impact the
overall abundance of the underlying resource. Furthermore, tradable rights
holders are necessarily within the "zone of interests" contemplated by
legislation regulating the underlying resource.
III. Environmental Resource Privatization Programs: Concrete Individual
Interest in Enforcement of Environmental Protection Legislation
Before considering how Tradable-rights programs may impact a plaintiff s
standing, it is helpful to first review the theory behind Tradable-rights programs
as well as the structure and objectives of the programs. Commentators
lamenting shortcomings in environmental protection efforts have focused on
the relationship between the absence of private property interests and
mismanagement of environmental resources. Since Hardin's Tragedy of the
Commons in the 1960s, these commentators have observed that without private
ownership, users tend to undervalue and underinvest in conservation,
regulation, and management, of common resources because they do not bear
the full costs of overusing and devaluing those resources.78 If a number of
private entities uses a common resource, no user internalizes the cost of
depleting it or has incentive to encourage optimal management either by
conserving usage itself or supporting use regulations. Creating property rights
to require users to hold a private stake in the value of the common resource
counteracts this problem by forcing users to internalize the cost of depletion,
thus incentivizing optimal management, conservation, and enforcement of
regulations over those resources.79 Private property regimes in common
77. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 9; Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162
ScI. 1243 (1968); Jan G. Laitos & Rachael B. Gamble, The Problem with Wilderness, 32 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 503, 555-56 (2008).
78. Daniel H. Cole, Clearing the Air: Four Propositions About Property Rights and
Environmental Protection, 10 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 103, 106 (1999); Harold Demsetz, Toward a
Theory ofProperty Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967); Hardin, supra note 77.
79. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 9, at 1341-42 ("[A]Ilowing polluters to buy and sell each
other's permits-thereby creating a powerful financial incentive for those who can clean up most
cheaply to sell their permits to those whose treatment costs are highest . .. will tend to bring about a
least-cost allocation of control burdens, . . . provide positive economic rewards for polluters who
develop environmentally superior products and processes. . . , and facilitate more intelligent setting of
priorities."); Hardin, supra note 77; Laitos & Gamble, supra note 77, at 555-56; Anthony C. Scott, The
Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership, 63 J. POL. EcoN. 116 (1955). This is not to argue that
tradable rights programs are always a superior or ideal means for resource management. See, e.g., David
M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to Global
Warming than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2009) (arguing that a carbon tax would be easier
to implement, more effective, and less risky than a tradable carbon emissions system); Daniel H. Cole &
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resources have three particular advantages over command and control
regulation: (a) they provide incentives to consume the resource at optimal
levels for the long term preservation of value, thereby discouraging short term
over-use; (b) they provide incentives to invest in preserving and maintaining
the resource; and (c) they promote a greater sense of stewardship of the
resource among those with rights to it, encouraging them to participate in and
enforce management decisions.so
For instance, in the context of individual fishing quotas, unrestricted quota
trading is thought to promote economic efficiency in the fisheries because those
willing to pay the highest price for a quota would be those expected to use that
quota most profitably by catching fish at a lower cost or transforming the fish
into a more valuable product. Over time, unrestricted trading should lead less
efficient fishermen to either improve their efficiency or sell their quotas.
Furthermore, the cap on each party's overall catch stifles costly
overinvestment, or a race to the bottom, among fishing fleets, since the total
shares of each fleet and its competitors are capped, and there is no economic
incentive to overinvest in competitive technology for the purpose of beating
competitors to catching the available fish. Fishing fleets need not race to catch
the most fish the quickest because they will be guaranteed the value of a given
volume of fish that year, either by fishing their permitted share or choosing to
sell their rights to their more efficient competitors.
Programs granting private tradable rights in environmental resources have
been an increasingly prominent means of supplementing command and control
regulation of public resources. Tradable-rights programs have been
implemented or proposed for a range of common resources, including
Peter Z. Grossman, When Is Command-and-Control Efficient? Intuitions, Technology, and the
Comparative Efficiency ofAlternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 Wisc. L.
REV. 887 (discussing the inaccuracy of the "prevailing view" that command-and-control regulation is
less efficient than alternative economic instruments such as effluent taxes and marketable permits).
Whether tradable rights regimes are the best regulatory alternative is likely to vary depending on the
subject, the industry, the economy, and the conservational requirements or objectives. I do not argue that
tradable rights represent a categorically preferable regulatory regime for promoting environmental
conservation. Rather, this discussion only aims to establish that tradable rights programs are popular
enough among policymakers and legislators to have been enacted and implemented successfully, and to
consider other potential legal uses and implications for these mechanisms. Since it appears as though
tradable rights programs are currently an established feature of our regulatory regime, and new ones are
being proposed, my aim is only to evaluate how they relate to other features of regulation and litigation.
80. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 9; Laitos & Gambel, supra note 77; Katrina Miriam
Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117,
159 (2005) ("[T]here are indications that fishers who own individual transferable quotas may be more
committed 'to the long-term sustainability of their stocks', less likely to seek increases in the overall
catch that is allowed, and more willing to invest in 'local cooperation and voluntary controls."') (quoting
Suzi Kerr, Richard Newell & James Sanchirico, Evaluating the New Zealand Individual Transferable
Quota Market for Fisheries Management 15-17 (Motu Econ. & Pub. Pol'y Research Trust, Working
Paper No. 2003-02, 2003), available at http://motu-www.motu.org.nz/wpapers/03 02.pdf); James T.B.
Tripp & Daniel J. Dudek, Institutional Guidelines for Designing Successful Tradable Rights Programs,
6 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 378 (1989); Scott, supra note 79.
81. See Wyman, supra note 80.
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individual transferable quotas in fisheries, marketable pollution permits or
allowances, tradable development rights, habitat conservation rights, and
transferable grazing rights.82
Tradable-rights programs operate by establishing resource conservation or
management objectives and placing an overall ceiling on the amount of the
resource that may be depleted. This ceiling is periodically determined in
accordance with the resource's overall abundance or scarcity. Based on this
aggregate ceiling administrators determine the number of rights available to
deplete the resource and periodically adjust the volume of resource depletion
permitted per each unit of tradable right. For instance, one quota share of
fishing rights may permit the holder to catch 1000 pounds of fish this year, but
an administrator may adjust that same quota share to permit only 800 pounds
the next year based on changes in the aggregate ceiling-depending on the
overall fish population. The resource rights and the amount of resource use
permitted per right are necessarily scarce, as they must reflect the resource's
scarcity and limit the number of possible purchasers in order to maintain
monetary value and encourage efficient use. Entities wishing to consume or
deplete the resource must purchase units for the entire volume of the resource
they consume. If an entity uses less of the resource than it is entitled to use, it
may sell the surplus rights to another.83
Hence, tradable rights establish a direct and tangible connection between
the aggregate abundance or availability of the resource and the value of the
owner's individual share, quota, or permit. Because the resource's aggregate
abundance determines the amount of resource depletion permitted per tradable
right unit, and because users must purchase rights to access the resource,
everyone using a resource shares the market for its tradable rights. Each rights
holder's individual interest is impacted by any action that threatens the
resource's overall availability, even if they are unable to establish a threat to the
specific portion of the resource they use. As the resource's availability
diminishes, the volume of resource depletion permitted per tradable right unit is
decreased, and the value of each tradable share is reduced for every tradable-
rights owner.
Tradable-rights holders have several different types of interests in the
underlying resource, depending on the nature and purpose of their ownership,
and to some extent the resource-privatization program involved. First, and most
plainly, every rights holder has an interest in enforcement of, and compliance
with, the quota or permit requirements among all other resource users.
82. David Sohn & Madeline Cohen, From Smokestacks to Species: Extending the Tradable
Permit Approach from Air Pollution to Habitat Conservation, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 405, 410 (1996);
Thomas Sterner, Tradable Permits, in POLICY INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 82 (Thomas Sterner ed., 2002); Tripp & Dudek, supra note 80.
83. Sohn & Cohen, supra note 82, at 411.
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Commentators have observed this, arguing that tradable rights incentivize all
holders to support enforcement of the quota and use restrictions:
The marketable permit system would also provide much stronger incentives for effective
monitoring and enforcement. If [rights holders] did not expect rigorous enforcement during
the term of their permits, this fact would show up at the auction in dramatically lower bids:
Why pay a lot for the right to [deplete the resource] legally when one can [deplete it] illegally
without serious risk of detection? ... Moreover, permit holders may themselves support strong
enforcement in order to ensure that cheating by others does not depreciate the value of the
permit holders' investments.'
Second, beyond concrete financial interest in enforcement of the quota
program itself, those holding quotas for the purpose of using the resource have
an interest in the resource's overall abundance. Administrators periodically
adjust the volume of resource depletion permitted for each quota unit in
accordance with the aggregate availability of the resource. Any action that
threatens aggregate resource availability threatens to reduce the volume of
resource use permitted or represented by each quota unit. A quota holder who
intends to use the resource is able to consume less of the resource per their
quotas whenever aggregate abundance of the resource decreases and the
volume of use permitted per quota share is reduced accordingly.
Third and alternatively, those holding rights for investment or resale-not
intending to use the resource-have an interest in ensuring use rights remain
scarce and valuable, and that the aggregate ceiling of resource use and volume
of use permitted per each quota share is adequately adjusted in accordance with
the resource's overall scarcity, and that the aggregate ceiling on resource use is
enforced. These holders have a concrete interest in ensuring that rights to use
each unit of the resource do indeed become more scarce (and costly) as the
resource becomes less abundant. 5
IV. Standing Based on Tradable Rights
A. Establishing Concrete and Particularized Individual Interest
Tradable rights confer interests on holders akin to two types of concrete
private interests that have consistently been found sufficient individual interests
for standing: a property interest and an interest in a share of a market. Though
the exact nature of the private interest created by Tradable-rights programs is
somewhat undefined, rights holders have a concrete private interest whose
value is directly linked to the aggregate availability of the resource and
84. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 9, at 1346 & n.32.
85. Clean Air Act Amendments Conference Report, 136 CONG. REC. S16,980 (daily ed. Oct.
27, 1990) (Statement of Sen. Max Baucus) ("[T]he allowance system is designed so that the allowances
will be treated in part like economic commodities .. . . Allowance holders should expect that allowances
will partake of durable economic value and that commercial and other relevant law will apply to
allowances and function to protect that value.").
224
Vol. 29, 2012
Tradable Environmental Resource Rights
dependent on the market for rights to use the resource. This suggests that
whether or not they are regarded as absolute property rights, tradable rights in a
resource do confer a concrete and particular individual interest in actions
impacting the aggregate availability of the resource and the market for resource
rights that is sufficient for standing.
1. Standing Based on a Property Interest
a. Are Tradable Rights Property?
There is a compelling argument that tradable environmental resource
rights create property rights, and therefore would presumptively confer holders'
standing.86 It is well established that property has a range of attributes,
commonly referred to as a bundle of sticks and the definition of property may
depend on the context or purpose for which it is defined. Tradable rights have
attributes that the Court has consistently recognized are fundamental elements
of property. The Court has emphasized that "[t]he hallmark of property . .. is
an individual entitlement grounded in state law, which cannot be removed
except 'for cause.' Once that characteristic is found, the types of interests
protected as 'property' are varied and, as often as not, intangible, relating to the
whole domain of social and economic fact." 87 Tradable rights have many more
of the concrete characteristics of property than many of the abstract, intangible
statutory entitlements that the Court has recognized constitutionally protected
property interests in,88 such as a driver's license or a horse trainer's license. 89
Despite their essential property characteristics, legislatures have been
reluctant to classify tradable rights as property because they want to preserve
86. Some commentators suggest that the Court has been more willing to grant standing when
the plaintiffs assert a property interest at stake than when they assert allegations of environmental harm.
See, e.g., Bradford Mank, Standing in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms: Using Economic Injury as
a Basis for Standing When Environmental Harm Is Difficult To Prove, 115 PENN. ST. L. REv. 307, 309
(2010) (explaining that Justice Scalia has been skeptical of standing based on threats of environmental
harm but has been more willing to grant standing if the plaintiffs allege property loss from threatened
environmental injury); Maxwell L. Stearns, From Lujan to Laidlaw: A Preliminary Model of
Environmental Standing, 11 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 321, 383-386 (2001) (theorizing that
environmental plaintiffs have obtained standing when their alleged injury was a decline in property
values independent of the threatened environmental harm, and that the Lujan plaintiffs would have
obtained standing if they alleged similar threat to property value).
87. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982) (citations omitted) (finding a
property interest in the right to adjudicatory procedures prescribed by the Fair Employment Practices
Act). Observing that four of the Supreme Court's recent decisions relied on different and unrelated
definitions of property in different contexts, Merrill suggests a "pattern definition" of property whereby
the definition of property for substantive constitutional protection under the Due Process Clause or
Takings Clause may differ from the definition of property for other purposes. Thomas W. Merrill, The
Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885 (2000).
88. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972) ("[Plrotection of 'property' . . . has been read
broadly to extend protection to any 'significant property interest,' including statutory entitlements.")
(citations omitted).
89. Logan, 455 U.S. at 430-3 1; Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1979).
225
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 29, 2012
authority to alter the rights or the volume of resource use permitted per rights
unit without qualifying as a "taking" of private property under the Takings
Clause of the Constitution.90 However, tradable rights necessarily have many
definitive characteristics of private property to provide the incentives they are
designed to achieve. As one commentator observed, "[t]hey are individual
allotments that are exclusive, durable, and alienable. Indeed, there is even a
registry of individual transferable quotas for recording security interests against
them, reminiscent of the registries of traditional property rights in land." 91 In
order to preserve the value, the holder must be able to maintain or sell the right
at will and have a high degree of certainty that the right will not be withdrawn
or alienated without compensation. Hence commentators consistently treat
tradable rights as property, categorizing them as a private-property-based
solution to the tragedy of the commons;92 and courts have discussed them in
property terms, describing holders of such interests as having "title" to
allowances. 93 Even a legislative report rejecting these allowances as property
rights for the purposes of the Takings Clause elaborated on the crucial
property-like characteristics of tradable rights and discussed the rights in
property terms:
[T]o exploit the efficiencies afforded by the allowance system, parties will transfer them
between and among themselves pursuant to a wide variety of commercial arrangements
Ownership of allowances by brokers, investors and other market makers will maintain fluidity
in the allowance market, link ultimate utility buyers with original sellers and facilitate rational
price-finding .... The Administrator should assure that transfers become effective as quickly
as possible with minimal burdens on the parties to the transfer . . . .No unit should be legally
entitled to avoid its emissions limitation obligations under this title by claiming possession of
allowances held, and applied to compliance, by another source. . . . allowance holders should
expect that allowances will partake of durable economic value and that commercial antitrust
and other relevant law will apply to allowances and function to protect that value.9
90. Clean Air Act Amendments Conference Report, supra note 85 ("[T]he reason for
characterizing the legal or property status of allowances in this title is to make clear that regulatory
actions taken subsequent to the issuance of allowances are not subject to the 'takings clause' of the U.S.
Constitution."); Henry E. Mazurek, Jr., The Future of Clean Air: The Application of Futures Markets to
Title IVof the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, 13 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 1, 23 & n.181
(1994) (explaining that the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act specify that emissions allowances do
not constitute property rights, and that the Senate conference report specified that allowances are not
protected property under the takings clause); Wyman, supra note 80, at 163 ("There is considerable
reluctance to characterize [emissions allowances] as [property rights] for fear of attracting takings
liability should it become necessary to reduce the value of the rights.").
91. Wyman, supra note 80, at 163-64.
92. See, e.g., Laitos & Gamble, supra note 77, at 560-61 ("Markets will not function at all, and
they will certainly not function efficiently, if property rights to the market's goods are either non-
existent or uncertain . . . . [T]radable environmental property rights . . . have been proposed or
implemented for fisheries, the atmosphere, and other natural resource commons."); Mazurek, supra note
90, at 10-11; Wyman, supra note 80, at 155-56.
93. Ormet Corp. v. Ohio Power Co., 98 F.3d 799, 807 (4th Cir. 1996) ("For allowances to 'be
treated like economic commodities,' their nature and those entitled to an interest in them must be
uniformly established throughout the market.") (quoting S. REP NO. 101-228, at 321 (1990)).
94. S. REP. NO. 101-228, at 320-21 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3704.
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A House Energy and Commerce Committee report issued during final
debate over the proposed Amendments described allowances as being "quasi-
property." Congress further emphasized the durable nature of an "allowance"
by granting "only Congress and the President, acting together through
legislation, the authority to limit or revoke allowances."95
Tradable-rights programs define the allowances much more in terms of
personal concrete value, alienability, and rights, to hold and to exclude than the
abstract entitlements, such as a license, that the Court has recognized as
property interests. Furthermore, tradable-rights holders can buy and sell rights
on an independent secondary market, formally register security interests against
tradable rights they own, and rely on the value of rights in the future.96 This all
suggests that tradable rights confer a judicially cognizable property interest.
b. Property Interests and Standing
Jurisprudence regarding standing based on a property interest suggests
that if tradable rights are considered rights akin to property rights, holders
would presumptively meet the standing requirements for litigation involving
the underlying resource. This is because courts generally consider a property
interest to establish automatically the requisite individual interest for standing,
and causation and redressibility requirements are also relaxed when an
individual can demonstrate a property interest at stake. Commentators
addressing the Court's standing jurisprudence in environmental cases have
observed this, noting, for instance, that Justice Scalia has been "willing to
consider the possibility that an environmental plaintiff could establish standing
without proof of environmental injury if he or she could show property loss
from a threatened environmental injury" even though he rejected the same
plaintiffs 'reasonable concerns' about a threatened environmental injury as
insufficient for standing." 97
Recently, the majority (including Justice Scalia) in Monsanto Co. v.
Geertson Seed Farms98 granted standing to farmers challenging the sale of
genetically modified seeds based on the threat to their property interests-the
preventative measures they needed to undertake due to the threat of cross-
95. Mazurek, supra note 90, at 11 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-490, at 366 (1990); 136 CONG.
REC. E360, E3672 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1990)).
96. The Court lent support to the property-like nature of transferable development rights by
finding that the zoning restrictions prohibiting owners of Grand Central Station from building upwards
did not constitute an uncompensated taking because the owners were effectively compensated for the
restriction with surplus transferable development rights, which they could sell to surrounding
developments-thus implying that tradable rights can themselves constitute compensation for Takings
Clause purposes. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978) ("[Rights to
develop airspace] are made transferable to at least eight parcels in the vicinity of the Terminal . ...
[T]he rights afforded are valuable. [They] undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has
imposed on appellants .... ).
97. Mank, supra note 86, at 310.
98. 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010).
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contamination. They majority did so despite skepticism about whether the
farmers could prove that their own farms were specifically facing an imminent
risk of cross-contamination. Monsanto, it is argued, can be understood as
establishing standing for "environmental plaintiffs who can make a plausible
showing of economic injury even in cases where it may be difficult to prove an
actual environmental harm to plaintiffs."99
Furthermore, the Court has recognized standing for qui tam plaintiffs who
bring informer or whistleblower suits, and who do not have a particular
individual interest in the violation in question, because those plaintiffs are
partial-assignees of the Government's property interest in the claim. 00 Lower
courts have captured how property interests presumptively confer an owner's
standing, explaining that "ownership or possession of property may provide
evidence of standing, and in some circumstances act as, in effect, a surrogate
for an inquiry into whether there is injury direct enough and sufficient enough
to sustain standing." 0  Another court explained that where a "statute . . .
provides an independent state law source of the plaintiff's property interest ...
plaintiff has a property interest at stake sufficient to give her standing to
prosecute this action." 02 Plaintiffs with property interests also face less of a
burden of establishing the particular harm that is likely to result from regulatory
failure. One court has held that "when the premises that are the subject of an
administrative agency's action are a party's property or are in close proximity
to a party's property, . . . that party may be presumed to be adversely affected
by a[n] [environmental protection law] violation and need not allege a specific
harm."'0 3 Monsanto can also be understood as supporting this proposition: the
plaintiff farmers might not have been able to establish cross-contamination of
their own farms was imminent, but it was sufficient that they were forced to
take measures protect their property from this treat.
Courts have also found the extent of, or lack of, a property interest to be
dispositive with respect to standing determinations and have found that
plaintiffs do not have standing because it has not shown that "the impacts of the
99. Mank, supra note 86, at 310.
100. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States, 529 U.S. 765, 774 (2000) (noting that the
Framers, as members of the first Congress, passed legislation providing for qui tam actions and included
jurisdiction over them in the Judiciary Act of 1789); see also Shay S. Scott, Combining Environmental
Citizen Suits & Other Private Theories of Recovery, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 369, 385-86 (1993)
("Where a plaintiff suffers personal injuries, physical harm to real estate, or harm to personal property,
courts have generally regarded these injuries as sufficiently 'different in kind' from the injuries suffered
by the general public.")
101. United States v. All Funds on Deposit at Citigroup Smith Barney Account No. 600-
00338, 617 F. Supp. 2d 103, 116 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting United States v. Cambio Exacto, 166 F.3d
522, 526-27 (2d Cir. 1999)).
102. Beauchesne v. Nimmo, 562 F. Supp. 250, 254 (D. Conn. 1983).
103. White Plains Downtown Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, Inc. v. Spano, 833 N.Y.S. 2d 868, 872 (Sup.
Ct. 2007) (internal citations omitted).
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[illegal action] will affect its property interests."' 0 4 Decisions suggest that
courts often consider parties' standing to sue to be coterminous with their
property rights in the affected resource. 05 If tradable rights are construed as
property rights, these cases suggest that a plaintiff holding tradable rights
would have a greatly increased likelihood of meeting the concrete and
particularized individual interest requirement in any litigation involving the
underlying resource.
While possession of a property interest is generally regarded as sufficient
evidence of individual injury establishing a plaintiff's standing to sue, it is not
necessary. The interests sufficient for standing are more expansive than
property interests. "Ownership . . . is only evidence of direct injury and an
individual who does not own the property at issue can still possess
constitutional standing ... ."106 While a property interest implies that the holder
has standing, interests less concrete than absolute property rights may also be
sufficient bases for standing. Next I will show that even if tradable rights are
not construed as property interests, they should nonetheless establish holders'
standing because they are analogous to concrete financial interests in a share of
a market that courts have consistently considered sufficient for standing.
2. Standing Based on Market Interest
Tradable rights to environmental resources establish a holder's concrete
interest in the market for the resource right. This interest is analogous to market
share interests that courts have found sufficient to confer standing. Courts have
consistently recognized that where an agency's action benefits someone with
whom the plaintiff competes in a market, the plaintiff has the requisite
individual interest for standing to challenge that agency action.'o 7
Indeed, the Court introduced the concrete individual interest standard in
order to recognize this type of standing in Data Processing.0 8 The plaintiffs
104. Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 420 F.3d 934, 938-39 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth
Circuit also held that two clients had standing to challenge a program that confiscated the interest earned
on their lawyer's trust accounts because they had a property interest at stake, but the lawyer whose
clients' interest was confiscated was "[w]ithout the requisite property right, [and thus] lacks standing to
challenge the IOLTA program." Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 271 F.3d 835, 847-48
(9th Cir. 2001).
105. Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 472, 483 (N.D. Okla. 2009) ("A plaintiff
does not have standing to assert a claim of injury to property it does not own or hold in trust. Although
the [plaintiff] has standing to assert its claims relative to its own rights in the [Illinois River Watershed],
it has no standing . .. to seek damages for injury to [other] lands and natural resources.") (quoting Tal v.
Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1254 (10th Cir. 2006)).
106. United States v. All Funds on Deposit at Citigroup Smith Barney Account No. 600-
00338, 617 F. Supp. 2d 103, 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d
674, 681 (9th Cir. 2001) ("That the litigant's interest must be greater than that of the public at large does
not imply that the interest must be a substantive right sounding in property or contract.").
107. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
108. Id. at 153 (explaining that the Court's previous standing decisions required the plaintiff
show that "the right invaded is a legal right-one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected
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sold data processing services, and the Comptroller of the Currency interpreted
the Bank Service Corporation Act to allow banks to sell data processing
services, increasing competition in the market for data processing services. The
data processing companies argued that the Comptroller allowed national banks
to compete illegally in the data processing services market, thereby increasing
competition in the market and diminishing their market share. The Court
recognized that even though the statute in question-governing regulation of
national banks-did not confer any legal rights directly on the plaintiff data
processing companies, the plaintiffs' interest in a share of the data processing
market was a sufficiently concrete individual interest for standing. The Court
reasoned that "certainly, he who is 'likely to be financially' injured may be a
reliable private attorney general to litigate the issues of the public interest."
1 09
In Sherley v. Sebelius,o10 a recent case following Data Processing's
market share theory, plaintiff stem cell researchers, who had received research
grants from the government, brought an APA action seeking review of the
National Institute of Health's (NIH) reinterpretation of the law governing stem
cell research grants that would expand the class of individuals entitled to apply
for the grants. Though the plaintiffs had been receiving research funding, and
their own eligibility to apply for grants was unaffected by the NIH's new
interpretation, the plaintiff researchers argued that the new interpretation would
permit more competitors to apply for funding, thereby diminishing their
likelihood of obtaining funding. The D.C. Circuit credited this theory, finding
the researchers had standing to challenge the interpretation because it "would
result in increased competition for limited federal funding and would thereby
injure their ability to successfully compete for . . . research funds." 1 In other
words, the agency's action threatened to decrease the plaintiffs' potential
market share of federal grants, and this threat to potential future value was a
sufficient interest to establish standing. The court explained, "We see no reason
any one competing for a governmental benefit should not be able to assert
competitor standing when the Government takes a step that benefits his rival
and therefore injures him economically."ll 2 The court observed that this could
encompass a range of scenarios, "for example, a seller facing increased
competition may lose sales to rivals, or be forced to lower its price or to expend
more resources to achieve the same sales, all to the detriment of its bottom
line."" 3 A party could presumptively meet standing requirements based solely
on the threat of illegally increased competition before actual injury occurs,
"[b]ecause increased competition almost surely injures a seller in one form or
against tortuous invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege") (quoting Tenn. Elec.
Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939)).
109. Id. at 154 (quoting FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940)).
110. 610 F.3d 69 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
111. Id.at71.
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another," and thus "he need not wait until allegedly illegal tiansactions . . .hurt
[him] competitively before challenging the regulatory (or, for that matter, the
deregulatory) governmental decision."ll 4
These cases, in which standing has been found based on an entity's
potential market share, suggest that a tradable right holder's interest in the
market for the rights would also be a sufficient individual interest for standing.
By establishing the holder's concrete economic interest in the value of
transferable rights, Tradable-rights programs could establish the holder's
standing to challenge illegal actions that threaten to devalue his share of the
market for those rights, or diminish the amount of rights available. This could
occur if an agency were to illegally allow overuse of the resource, allow others
to use the resource without paying for the rights to it, or take any other illegal
action that increased the depletion of the resource. As a result, the aggregate
resource consumption level would approach the annual ceiling, thus
diminishing the amount of resource use permitted overall and per quota share
during that time period.
B. Meeting the Causal Nexus Requirement
The second and third prongs of the standing determination, taken together,
require the plaintiff to demonstrate that there is a causal nexus between the
agency's action and the impact on the plaintiff's concrete interest. In particular,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that the agency's action will directly cause the
plaintiff's individualized injury such that the potential injury could be redressed
by a favorable decision. As the Court observed in Lujan, establishing a causal
nexus between a regulatory failure (usually with respect to a third party) and
the harm to the plaintiffs individual interest is difficult for environmental
plaintiffs. The court has rejected the "ecosystem nexus" standing theory that
anyone who uses any part of a continuous ecosystem is adversely affected by
activity that impacts a part of the ecosystem." However, in cases discussed
above, where plaintiffs are competing in a market with the "regulated (or
regulable) third party," courts found that the causation and redressability
requirements were satisfied. While plaintiffs were not "the object of the
government action or inaction [they] challenge,"1 6 the agency's action clearly
caused their injury such that the injury would be redressed by a favorable
decision. As the court noted in Sherley, "economic actors 'suffer [an] injury in
fact when agencies lift regulatory restrictions on their competitors or otherwise
allow increased competition' against them," and it is "clear the [plaintiffs]
alleged injury was traceable to the [agency's action] and redressable by the
114. Id. (internal citations omitted).
115. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1992). The Court also rejected
"animal nexus" and "vocational nexus" theories. Id.
116. Id. at 561-62.
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court."ll 7 The cases in which standing was based on a property interest also
suggest that plaintiffs whose property interests are implicated face less of a
burden in establishing causation and redressability.118
The concrete individual interests of a tradable-rights-holding plaintiff-
both the amount of permitted depletion per resource right and the market value
of the rights-depend on the aggregate availability of the resource. It is thus
impacted by all agency actions that threaten to deplete or mismanage the
resource on whole, even if there is no particular effect on a specific portion of
the resource the rights holder uses. This includes agency actions with respect to
third parties that will impact the overall market for resource rights. Plaintiffs
holding tradable rights could establish causation and redressability by showing
that the challenged agency action (or inaction) or private violation is likely to
impact overall abundance of the resource. Because the value of the holders'
tradable rights is necessarily determined in accordance with the overall use
ceiling, which is based on aggregate availability of the resource, there is a
direct causal connection between any illegal action threatening the resource's
aggregate abundance and the amount of resource use represented by each
tradable-rights unit. Or, in a different and even easier scenario, plaintiffs
holding tradable rights could establish causation and redressibility where the
agency permits others to deplete the resource without purchasing necessary
permits, thereby reducing the market for and price of tradable rights. This
averts the Summers problem of showing that the general regulatory action with
respect to a third party, while likely to impact the resource overall, will likely
harm a portion of the resource in which the plaintiff has a particular
individualized interest. I will further illustrate this connection in the case
studies discussed in Part V.
C Meeting the "Zone ofInterests" Requirement
In addition, owning tradable environmental rights also would enable a
plaintiff to meet the "zone of interests" requirement for APA review. The zone
of interest standard has been met by plaintiffs who have financial or private
interests that are impacted by agency action, even when the agency's broader
purpose or mandate is unrelated those plaintiffs' private interests. 119
There are two strands of doctrine regarding the type of interest necessary
to be within the "zone of interests" entitled to challenge agency implementation
of environmental protection laws. The majority of decisions find an economic
117. Sherley v. Sebelius, 610 F.3d 69, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting La. Energy & Power Auth.
v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
118. See Section V.a.i, infra.
119. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (holding that ranchers' financial interest was
sufficient for standing to seek review of a biological opinion issued under the ESA about a threatened
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interest to be a sufficient interest for a plaintiff to be within the "zone of
interests" entitled to APA review. The Court has maintained that
the fact of economic injury is what gives a person standing to seek judicial review under the
[APA's review provision], but once review is properly invoked, that person may argue the
public interest in support of his claim that the agency has failed to comply with its statutory
mandate.1
20
These cases make it more difficult for environmental plaintiffs whose
interests are ideological, scientific, or otherwise not purely economic, to
establish that they are within the "zone of interests" of the statute in question.
On the other hand, a narrow strand of cases under NEPA holds that a solely
economic interest does not bring a plaintiff within the zone of interests
contemplated by NEPA and is not a sufficient basis for standing to sue for
noncompliance with the Act.' 2 1 These cases create barriers for plaintiffs who
may have legitimate grievances of noncompliance with the Act's requirements
for assessing the environmental impacts of agency action, but whose sole
connection to the agency action in question is potential economic loss.
It seems that tradable environmental rights confer interests upon holders
that meet both of these economic and non-economic "zone of interests"
standards. Tradable environmental rights establish holders' economic interests
in enforcement of legislation governing underlying resources and therefore
meet the standard under a majority of cases holding that economic interest
establishes plaintiff as being within the zone of interests. Tradable rights also
establish a unique type of economic interest in environmental resources that is
contemplated within the statutory scheme and directly and deliberately tied to
effective enforcement of environmental regulations, which should meet the
requirements of NEPA cases requiring more than sole economic interest. An
environmental regulation statute creating a tradable-rights program
contemplates the interests of tradable rights holders above those with incidental
economic interests in the outcome of regulatory decisions. As Tradable-rights
programs are designed to supplement regulatory legislation and to create
incentives for rights holders to manage resources, the interest of rights holders
cannot be "so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in
the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to
permit the suit"22 for any statute prescribing or impacting governance of the
underlying resource. In the next Part, I will discuss examples of how Tradable-
rights programs would enable holders to meet individual interest,
causation/redressability, and "zone of interests" requirements.
120. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737 (1972); see also Lee v. Resor, 348 F. Supp.
389, 392 (M.D. Fla. 1972) ("Economic injuries will provide standing sufficient to justify judicial review,
even in situations where there is no statutory provision granting such review.").
121. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
122. Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987).
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V. Case Studies
In this Part, I will discuss two currently operating tradable environmental
rights programs-individual transferable fishing quotas and tradable
development rights in the New Jersey pinelands-to illustrate the ways in
which these programs could be used to confer standing on litigants seeking to
enforce environmental regulations. Then I will briefly discuss litigation
involving tradable rights illustrating that they have served as a basis for
standing in other contexts.
A. Individual Transferable Fishing Quotas
To promote conservation and management of fisheries resources in the
U.S. and its coastal waters, the federal Fishery Conservation and Management
Act (FCMA) divided federal responsibility for fisheries among eight regional
councils and enabled them to adopt individual fishing quota (IFQ) programs to
manage fisheries. 12 3 In 2002, the eleven federal fisheries operating under IFQ
programs accounted for fifty-three percent of the overall volume of federal
fisheries.124 IFQ programs allocate quota shares in the regional "pool" of their
fish species among eligible fishermen in order to fish in the region. These quota
shares entitle the holder to a given percent of the total allowable catch within
the pool that year. Each year, Regional Fishing Councils determine the total
allowable catch based on the health of the regional fishery and the amount of
fish allocated to IFQ fisheries, which is determined in relation to annual global
fishing limits on the species.12 5 Quota holders are permitted to catch the volume
of fish proportional to their quota share of the total allowable catch each year,
which is determined in relation to the aggregate amount of fish all fisheries are
permitted to catch that year. "Authorized pounds for annual IFQ permits are
determined by the number of [quota share] units held, the total number of
[quota share] units in the 'pool' for a species and area, and the total amount of
halibut or sablefish allocated for IFQ fisheries in a particular year." 26 Fishing
quota holders can buy, sell, lease, or otherwise transfer some or all of their
shares, depending on how much or how little they want to participate in the
123. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801, 1852 (2006); Sarah Bittleman, Toward More Cooperative Fisheries
Management: Updating State and Federal Jurisdictional Issues, 9 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 349, 355 (1996).
124. Wyman, supra note 80, at 170.
125. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-277, INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTAS: METHODS
FOR COMMUNITY PROTECTION AND NEW ENTRY REQUIRE PERIODIC EVALUATION 6 (2004). For
example, each year the International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC) applies a preset formula to its
updated findings on the abundance and health of the halibut population in order to determine the overall
limits on the biomass of halibut that may be taken during the upcoming year, For a discussion of this,
see STEPHEN R. HARE, POTENTIAL MODIFICATIONS TO THE IPHC HARVEST POLICY (2010), available at
http://www.iphc.int/papers/HPupdate.pdf
126. Individual Fishing Quota (IFQ) Program, NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV.: ALASKA
REGIONAL OFFICE, http://www.fukr.noaa.gov/ram/ifq.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2011) (emphasis added).
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fishery. 12 7 Fishers who catch less than their percentage may sell surplus fishing
allowances to those who wish to catch more.
Holding fishing quota shares would likely confer standing on plaintiffs
who would otherwise have difficulty establishing that an agency's regulatory
action with respect to a third party would injure that portion of the population
that comprises the plaintiffs' individualized interest. The easiest case is a
challenge to an agency's failure to enforce or implement the quota system
against third parties. Because enforcement of quota requirements is necessary
to maintain the value of quotas, every quota holder has a concrete and
particular interest in ensuring that quota requirements are enforced against all
others. Failure to enforce quota requirements against a third party (allowing the
third party to catch more fish than the amount to which his shares entitle him)
directly impacts the concrete value of every quota holder by undermining the
value of the quotas. This failure provides an immediate advantage to a
competitor who fishes without paying for a quota. In addition, the enforcement
failure directly devalues the quota shares on the secondary market by reducing
demand for such quota shares. This automatically establishes the nexus
between the failure to regulate the third party and the plaintiff's injury akin to
the standing theory in Sherley, where the causal nexus was "clear" "when the
Government takes a step that benefits [a plaintiffs] rival and therefore injures
him economically."12 8
A more challenging, but nonetheless viable case would be a citizen
enforcement action to prosecute a violation of another environmental law with
a citizen suit provision, such as the CWA. Because the quotas are framed in
terms of percent of total allowable catch, and the total allowable catch is
determined with reference to international or regional abundance of the fish
species, a fishing quota holder could have standing to prosecute any private
violation of the CWA that threatens the aggregate regional fish population,
since it is likely to impact the value of his quota shares.12 9 This same theory
could be employed for challenges to any regulatory failure that results in a
lapse in the protection of fish populations, such as the MMS's mismanagement
of oil drilling, or in a failure to comply with NEPA (failing to issue
environmental impact statements, for instance) that might threaten the
aggregate or regional fish population.
This is so regardless of whether the private violation threatening the fish
population is proximal to the quota holder or physically threatens the local
population from which he draws his catch. This is because any action reducing
the total fish population would reduce the total allowable catch that year, which
127. U.S. GEN. AccOuNTING OFFICE, supra note 125.
128. Sherley v. Sebelius, 610 F.3d 69, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
129. Various CWA violations, even remote from fisheries, may impact fish populations.
Runoff into rivers from storm sewers, in which insecticides or other toxins are dumped, may harm fish
populations down-river. See Lozeau, supra note 30, at 444-45.
235
Yale Journal on Regulation
would decrease the volume of fish represented by each quota share, or the
volume of permitted catch per each quota share. Quota holders would have to
purchase more quota in order to fish the volume to which they would have been
entitled without damage to the overall fish population. Thus, the plaintiff can
show causation of his individual injury solely by establishing the threat to the
aggregate resource, since that injury to the resource on the whole automatically
causes him individualized injury, as well: The threat reduces the amount of fish
he is permitted to catch, regardless of whether he can establish a specific threat
to his local population or the amount he is physically able to catch. The
Summers problem and discussion of events preceding the Gulf oil spill
illustrate that it is substantially easier to prove that a third party's violation of,
or failure to enforce, regulations will cause damage to the overall fish
population than it is to prove the violation causes damage to a specific portion
of the resource, and that the plaintiff has an individualized interest in that
specific portion.
B. New Jersey Pinelands Transferable Development Rights
New Jersey's Pinelands Development Credit Program implements
tradable development rights (TDRs) in order to facilitate conservation of the
New Jersey Pinelands, a National Reserve containing the largest pinelands in
the world including approximately one million acres of forests, wetlands,
creeks, and rivers. 30 The Pinelands TDR program governs development in
seven counties and fifty-two municipalities in the Pinelands region. It operates
by allocating a fixed number of development credits to each parcel of land and
restricting land development to the credits possessed by that parcel. In order to
further develop land, owners must purchase development rights that are
absolutely scarce. TDRs are not only tradable among landowners.
Conservationists and speculators may also acquire and hold them without
owning land in the region. There are no region- or area-specific limitations on
TDR sales: someone with excess credits in a preservation or agricultural area
can sell credits to speculators and landowners in urban areas where there is
growing pressure for development, such as the Pineland areas adjacent to the
Atlantic City, Philadelphia, New York and Northern New Jersey metropolitan
areas.13 1 The economic value of Pinelands TDRs is assured because of
enforcement: developers must acquire development rights for each unit that
they increase density of development. The broad geographic area covered and
development in metropolitan areas ensures significant demand for development
rights relative to their supply.' 32 Thus, as pressure for development increases,
130. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:18A-I (West 2010).
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the price of development rights and the cost of depleting natural Pinelands
increase.
Given a program like this, it seems a fairly easy case that an owner of
TDRs could have standing to challenge an agency's failure to enforce the TDR
requirements with respect to a third party. The theory would be the same as that
previously described for IFQs: allowing any third party to increase
development without purchasing the required TDRs would diminish the market
for TDRs and undermine the value of TDRs for all other holders.
A more difficult, but nonetheless viable case, would involve using TDRs,
which are essentially a share in the value of undeveloped forest land, as a basis
for standing to challenge agency implementation of other environmental
protection legislation that threatens undeveloped forest land, as in Summers.
Because the Program is designed to encourage conservation of undeveloped
forest land, TDRs are priced in accordance with available undeveloped forest
land so that the cost of depleting undeveloped land reflects the scarcity of
undeveloped land. If an agency takes an action, as in Summers, that threatens to
illegally diminish the aggregate amount of undeveloped forest land, it would
directly impact all TDR holders by increasing the scarcity of undeveloped land,
decreasing the volume of development permitted per unit of development
rights, and increasing the cost of development. As in the above discussion of
IFQs, the causal nexus between the agency's illegal action and impact on any
TDR holders' interest is automatically established by showing that the illegal
action threatens the aggregate abundance of undeveloped land, as opposed to
making the much more difficult showing that the regulatory failure will impact
a specific tract of forest in which the plaintiff has a physical interest. It is
empirically much easier to demonstrate that an aggregate decrease in
undeveloped land will reduce the amount the plaintiff is permitted to develop
than to make the Summers-like showing that the plaintiffs particular tract of
land will likely be physically impacted.
C. Litigation Involving Tradable Rights
No court has directly addressed the question of whether owning tradable
rights to an environmental resource is a sufficiently concrete individual interest
to challenge noncompliance with regulations governing the underlying
resource. However, litigation involving tradable rights suggests that they
represent a sufficient interest for standing to challenge actions directly
impacting the value of the rights. In the most informative case, the Northern
District of New York considered a suit challenging a New York law requiring
all sulfur dioxide emissions allowances to be sold with a restrictive covenant
barring later transfer to users in certain states. The suit was brought by the
Clean Air Markets Group (CAMG), an organization whose purpose is to
promote the use of tradable allowances and one member of which held
emissions allowances. The district court held, and the Second Circuit affirmed,
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that because attaching this restrictive covenant lowered the value of allowances
2.5-5.0%, CAMG's allowance-owning member "has suffered a diminution in
value of its SO2 allowances, an injury in fact."l
33 The district court rejected the
defendant's claim that the allowance owner did not meet standing requirements
because it did not actually sell its allowances. It was sufficient injury that the
plaintiff "establish[ed] that the loss in value of . .. [its] SO2 allowances was
caused by New York's requirement." 3 4 Because the plaintiff was challenging
government action that pertained to the tradable-rights instruments themselves,
as opposed to the underlying resource, this case differs from the scenarios
contemplated in the above case studies, where tradable rights would be the
basis for standing to sue when regulatory failure pertains to regulating the
underlying resource. This case nonetheless shows that a small reduction (2.5-
5.0%) in the value of tradable rights would be a sufficiently concrete and
particularized interest for standing purposes.
Another case involving tradable rights further suggests that they are a
sufficient interest to confer a right to sue on the holder. Ormet Corp. v. Ohio
Power Co. 135 did not address a standing question, but the Fourth Circuit found
federal question jurisdiction over a dispute involving tradable allowances. In
doing so, the court addressed the judicial remedies available to parties with
interests in tradable allowances. This case was a dispute between two parties
about who was entitled to a large percentage of the emissions allowances the
EPA had issued to a power generating station. The litigants contended that the
emissions allowances were worth $40 million. Finding federal question
jurisdiction over this dispute, the panel observed that Congress intended "for
allowances to trade as a commodity with durable economic value," and
explained:
In establishing a system of marketable allowances, Congress intended for disputes among
allowance holders to be resolved in the same manner as are other private commercial disputes
. . . . The Act creates proprietary interests in emissions allowances and provides for their
transferability. While the Act gives certain persons rights to those allowances, it provides no
mechanism for enforcement of those rights. On the contrary, the Act . . . seeks only to clarify
"the ways in which the allowance system would mesh with private-commercial relationships"
. . . . We believe it clear that Congress intended that disagreements over the allocation of
allowances be resolved by existing methods of dispute resolution. 36
This statement that the allowance holders have "proprietary interests"
which Congress intended to be litigated the same way as other "private
commercial disputes" also suggests that owners of tradable allowances have an
133. Clean Air Mkts. Grp. v. Pataki, 194 F. Supp. 2d 147, 156 (N.D.N.Y. 2002), aff'd, 338
F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2003).
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. 98 F.3d 799 (4th Cir. 1996).
136. Id. at 801 (internal citation omitted).
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individual interest sufficient for standing to litigate matters involving the value
of the allowances.
Conclusion
This Note has argued that owning tradable rights may avert barriers to
standing for plaintiffs bringing APA review or citizen enforcement actions to
enforce implementation of or compliance with environmental regulation.
Tradable-rights ownership could enable plaintiffs to meet the constitutional
standing requirements of both (a) concrete and particularized individual interest
and (b) causation/redressability. Furthermore, it would establish a plaintiff
within the "zone of interests" contemplated by the regulatory legislation.
A. Confronting Potential Objections
Readers may offer a number of objections to this potential application of
tradable rights. First, the argument that a threatened reduction in the value of a
given quota share creates a cognizable property interest for standing purposes
defies the legislature's express choice not to call the entitlements "property" for
fear of invoking Takings liability. It is true that the legislature did deliberately
immunize the government from Takings liability for adjustments in tradable-
rights allotments, which are part of the conservation program. However, this
objection overlooks an important logical distinction between the type of interest
that should be required for Takings liability and that which should be required
for standing to bring an action seeking only declaratory relief, such as an APA
review or citizen enforcement action. Immunity from Takings claims should
not preclude the availability of APA review or citizen enforcement actions,
which must be based on illegal action of a private violator or an implementing
agency and seek only to enjoin that illegal action. Takings liability is distinct
because it is not based on illegal action, but requires compensation even when
the Government's actions are legal. Precluding Takings liability for tradable
rights ensures that the government is not liable for legal adjustments in quota
allotments necessary to execute the regulatory scheme. These adjustments, if
made legally, would never be a basis for a citizen suit or APA review action
because the agency has not violated the law. Therefore, my scheme does not
impact program administrators' immunity from Takings liability based on legal
adjustments in tradable-rights allotments.
It follows that the interest required to invoke Takings liability, in which a
plaintiff is seeking compensation for lost property regardless of liability, would
be more concrete than the interest required for standing where plaintiffs are
merely seeking to show that they have a sufficient stake to enjoin illegal action,
but are not seeking compensation for the lost value. The law seems to accept
that there are varying levels of property-like interests that give rise to different
degrees of legal protection: the strongest property interests invoke Takings
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liability, lesser interests may not give rise to Takings liability but nonetheless
warrant Due Process protection, and even less concrete private interests may be
cognizable for standing.137 This objection based on Takings liability overlooks
the distinction between less absolute property interests that are judicially
cognizable for the purpose of standing and absolute property interests that are a
basis for Takings liability.
A second concern might be that using tradable rights this way could
enable activist groups to purchase rights for the sole purpose of obtaining
standing. This could potentially alter the market for rights, raising demand and
overall prices. There are several possible responses to this concern. First,
because these are actions for injunctive relief only, there is no threat of a single
violation generating a series of actions from multiple plaintiffs seeking
compensation. While one activist group could theoretically attempt, as a group
or through a member, to obtain associational standing, there would be little risk
of multiple parties doing so. Once an action for injunctive or declaratory relief
is litigated or a citizen suit prosecuted, other citizens could not bring the same
complaint. Accordingly, insofar as the proposal this Note outlines would allow
plaintiffs to purchase rights for the purpose of bringing litigation, their impact
on the market would likely be minimal.
Second, the prospect of would-be plaintiffs altering the value of rights in
order to obtain standing is no more problematic than the impact of
conservationists purchasing and holding rights to decrease overall resource
depletion: the price would go up either way. Many Tradable-rights programs
permit the latter behavior because it allows the market to reflect the value of the
resource to conservationists as well as users. Permitting all interested parties to
participate in the market enables more accurate pricing of resource use,
reflecting the value of the resource to users and other parties alike. This Note
suggests that resources are not only valuable to those who wish to consume
them and those who wish to preserve them, but also to those who seek to hold
shares in a resource to confer standing for litigation. When a conservationist
purchases and holds a tradable right without using it, rights generally become
more scarce and expensive for all users, and the resource's value to
conservationists is factored into the cost of depletion. If an interest group
purchased tradable rights for standing purposes the market would also reflect
their interest in regulation or management of the underlying resource and the
resource would be priced even more accurately, taking into account a broader
range of interested parties.
137. For a discussion of variance in the strength of property interests, see Merrill, supra note
87, at 952-54, which describes a "patterning definition" of property and observes that an interest may
qualify as property for commodity, economic, and standing purposes, but not for constitutional
purposes. There are many property interests, such as employment benefits or entitlement to a license,
that are cognizable for Due Process purposes-without invoking Takings liability. And such a property
interest that triggers Due Process protection would certainly be a sufficient interest for standing, even
though it does not trigger Takings liability.
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Third, activist groups seeking associational standing to challenge agency
action already engage in this practice when possible. The plaintiff in Clean Air
Markets Group, discussed above, was an advocacy organization interested in
promoting use of tradable emissions. It based its associational standing on one
member who owned tradable rights. This did not cause a problem for the
tradable-rights market because no other plaintiff sought to bring a suit for
declaratory or injunctive relief of that nature. Once the suit was brought and the
New York law was declared invalid under the Clean Air Act, no other activist
group had any reason to acquire tradable rights in that market. Analogously,
associations seeking to challenge agency failure to enforce regulation may find
a plaintiff with property near affected land to serve as lead plaintiff in citizen
suits or APA actions,' 38 yet no observers have concluded that this practice
disrupts the housing market in such areas. The market for resource-based
litigation simply is not big enough to harm overall trade in tradable rights.
On a related point, skeptics worry that using tradable rights as a basis for
standing in citizen suits and APA review actions might discourage legislation
providing for tradable-rights programs. This concern loses sight of the fact that
this discussion applies only to laws in which the legislature has expressly
attempted to enable citizens to sue via citizen suit provisions and APA review
actions. In the cases contemplated by this discussion, court-imposed standing
requirements have prevented citizens from suing even though statutes granted
them the right to do so. Since plaintiffs relying on tradable rights would still
need a cause of action under a citizen suit provision or the APA, the tradable
rights would only enable standing in cases in which the legislature has
otherwise chosen to provide causes of action to citizen plaintiffs. If Congress
does, at some point, want to enact a tradable-rights program while barring
standing for enforcement suits based on those rights, it would presumably enact
the statute without a citizen suit provision, and it could also stipulate in the
legislation that rights holders are not within the "zone of interests" of the
legislation as is required to obtain APA review.
B. Advantages of Tradable Rights as a Basis for Standing
In Part III, I discussed two main arguments against citizen enforcement
actions: (a) that they open the floodgates for frivolous enforcement actions; and
(b) that they violate the constitutional requirements of Article I and Article III.
Using tradable rights as a basis for standing in citizen suits could ameliorate
both of these criticisms.
The tradable rights basis eliminates both elements of the floodgates
concern: that too many plaintiffs would bring enforcement actions, and that
these actions would be based on frivolous violations of technical requirements
138. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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that are not actually environmentally harmful. The first element of the
floodgates concern-too many plaintiffs bringing actions-would be
eliminated. Primarily, it is important to emphasize that the causes of action in
these cases only permit one suit per legal violation, since they limit remedies to
an injunction. These causes of action therefore do not tend to give rise to
"floodgates risks." Once a plaintiff successfully challenges a violation and it is
enjoined, there is no cause for other plaintiffs to bring claims since they cannot
obtain individual damages. Relying on tradable rights would ensure that the one
suit brought to challenge a violation is brought by one of few individuals who
substantiate their stake in compliance with a financial interest in rights, that are
necessarily scarce and expensive. As the Court in Data Processing observed,
"[c]ertainly, he who is 'likely to be financially' injured may be a reliable
private attorney general to litigate the issues of the public interest . . . .,9 This
would filter out plaintiffs without sufficient interest or resources to advocate
zealously.
The second element of the floodgates concern-enabling frivolous suits
based on trivial violations of technical provisions-is also ameliorated. Using
tradable rights as a basis for standing in citizen suits would ensure that
plaintiffs only had standing to prosecute violations that were truly material. A
plaintiff bringing a citizen suit on the basis of his tradable rights only has
standing where the agency's illegal action actually threatens to devalue the
rights. This would only be the case if the agency materially deviated from the
regulatory scheme, either by failing to enforce the quotas or by taking some
other action that altered the overall scarcity of the resource, thereby increasing
the cost of rights to use the resource.
The discussion of cases permitting standing in which the plaintiff has a
property interest or a financial interest in a market that is impacted by illegal
action illustrates how the two constitutional infirmities commonly attributed to
citizen enforcement, the alleged violation of the Take Care Clause in Article II
and the Case or Controversy Clause in Article III, are avoided if standing is
based on an interest in tradable rights. All of the cases in which standing was
based on either a property interest, a statutory entitlement akin to a property
interest, or a financial interest in a market suggest that individuals can bring
claims to protect their private rights without intruding upon the Executive's
obligation to "take Care that the Laws are faithfully executed." 40 When
tradable rights form the basis of a plaintiffs individual interest in a citizen
enforcement action, he is suing based on an analogous private interest. When a
litigant bases his interest on tradable rights, the cases show that the action also
clearly meets the case-or-controversy requirement: the parties have a concrete
139. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970) (quoting
FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940)); accord Sherley v. Sebelius, 610 F.3d 69
(D.C. Cir. 2010).
140. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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private interest at stake, the value of which is threatened by allegedly illegal
agency action.
This approach to standing differs from a legislative conferral of an
abstract procedural right to enforcement upon all citizens because
environmental privatization programs create real and tangible interests that are
scarce and have independent market value. By definition these rights cannot be
conferred upon all citizens, and therefore inherently vest holders with a
concrete interest in agency enforcement that is a "particularized one, which sets
him apart from the citizenry at large."' 4 1 Because the value of each holder's
right is directly and necessarily tied both to effective enforcement with permit
requirements and aggregate abundance of the resource, rights holders face
injury that is traceable to any illegal action affecting the resource's aggregate
abundance or the market for tradable rights.
Insofar as a concrete and particularized individual interest is the real
barrier to citizen participation in agency oversight, private tradable rights
created by environmental privatization programs should confer standing on
holders to challenge regulatory failures and private violations that threaten the
underlying resource. Even if courts were to reject this theory of standing,
considering it is nonetheless enlightening, as it interrogates the values that
really animate courts in determining whether to adjudicate disputes between
members of the public and the executive regarding implementation of
regulatory legislation.
141. Scalia, supra note 39.
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